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Food, Animals, and the Constitution: 
California Bans on Pork, Foie Gras,  
Shark Fins, and Eggs 
Ernesto Hernández-López* 
Animal welfare policies focused on food production cook up 
significant constitutional controversies. Since 2008, California has tried 
to ban the sale of certain edible items made from animals. Eaters and 
farmers challenge these policies, citing economic discrimination and 
preemption by federal statutes, in violation of the Constitution’s 
Dormant Commerce and Supremacy Clauses, respectively. This food-
and-animal jurisprudence includes pork products in National Meat 
Association v. Harris (2012); foie gras in Association des Éleveurs de 
Canards et D’Oies du Québec v. Harris (2013) and Association des 
Éleveurs de Canards et D’Oies du Québec v. Becerra (2017); shark 
fins in Chinatown Neighborhood Association v. Harris (2015); and 
eggs in Missouri v. Harris (2016). These cases regard California’s 
animal welfare policies to ban: pork products from “downer” swine, who 
are immobile; force-feeding ducks to make foie gras; shark fins used in 
soup in Chinese cuisine; and eggs from hens housed in battery cages. 
These policies raise legal questions beyond what is inhumane, forcing 
courts to decide if Californian food choices create barriers to interstate 
commerce or conflict with federal food statutes on meat, poultry, and 
marine conservation. This Article argues that state-level food policies 
improving animal treatment will face judicial inquiry, balancing 
preventing animal cruelty with federal concerns for economic 
discrimination, uniformity, and costs passed on to eaters and food 
producers. This Article identifies how California policies exemplify 
larger conflicts placing states and animal advocates against eaters and 
farmers. Constitutional law will serve as an important ingredient to 
settle these stewing conflicts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
What happens when California tries to improve how animals are treated in 
food production by banning the sale of foie gras, shark fin, and certain kinds of 
pork and eggs? Simmering constitutional debates begin to appear between state-
level policies and federal legal doctrines. Disputes over the Constitution’s Dormant 
Commerce Clause1 and Supremacy Clause2 fuel this fire between those who try to 
 
* Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law, ehernand@chapman.edu. This Article was 
prepared for the “UC Irvine Food Equity Symposium.” It has benefitted from comments from 
Symposium participants and participants at the Fowler Law School COTES Faculty Workshop, Law 
and Society Association Annual Meeting, Vermont Law School Environmental Law Colloquium, 
Loyola Chicago Constitutional Law Colloquium, Arizona State University Sustainability Law 
Conference, Colorado Law School Food Law Workshop, and SoClass Law and Social Science 
Conference at Claremont College. The author thanks Associate Dean Donald Kochan for draft and 
research suggestions and research support; Graeme Boushey, Laurie Beyranevand, Erika George, 
Stephen Lee, Alison Peck, Ronald Rotunda, Kenneth Stahl, and Michael Tenenbaum for their research 
suggestions; Shawn Etemadi for his research assistance; and the Hugh & Hazel Darling Library staff, 
especially Sherry Leysen and Brendan Starkey, for the research support. 
1. The Dormant Commerce Clause operates as a limitation on states enacting laws that impose 
substantial burdens on interstate commerce. See Nat’l Ass’n of Optometrists & Opticians v. Harris, 682 
F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2012). It is a judicial doctrine interpreting the Constitution’s Commerce Clause 
in Article I, Section 8, cl. 3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
2. This Article describes how the preemption doctrine, interpreting the Supremacy Clause, 
Constitution Article VI, clause 2, is used to displace state regulation when federal law encompasses the 
subject field. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl 2. 
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advance animal welfare3 and those who defend eating choices under the “food 
freedom”4 banner. Since 2008, California has attempted to limit animal cruelty in 
food industries with policies directed at slaughtering immobile swine called 
“downers;”5 foie gras, liver from force-fed ducks;6 shark fins;7 and eggs from hens 
in large-scale housing called “battery cages.”8 California has looked to state power 
to address animal suffering, argued to be intrinsic to eating and making these 
foodstuffs. In response, California has tried to ban the sale or possession of these 
edible items. 
Four recent court cases involving California show how disputes about animals 
in food production simultaneously examine the Constitution and food. The disputes 
address downer slaughter in National Meat Association v. Harris (2012);9 foie gras in 
Association des Éleveurs de Canards et D’Oies du Québec v. Harris (2013) (Association 
des Éleveurs I )  and Association des Éleveurs de Canards et D’Oies du Québec v. Becerra 
 
3. For descriptions of animal welfare, see Temple Grandin, Animal Welfare and Society Concerns 
Finding the Missing Link, 98 MEAT SCI. 461 (2014) (summarizing how animal welfare regimes are 
applied to different meat industries); Cheryl L. Leahy, Large-Scale Farmed Animal Abuse and Neglect: 
Law and Its Enforcement, 4 J. ANIMAL L. & ETHICS 63 (2011) (describing how animal cruelty laws are 
not applied to agriculture and the abuse and mistreatment animals experience). 
4. For scholarly and policy literature on “food freedom” issues, see generally BAYLEN 
LINNEKIN & MICHAEL BACHMANN, THE ATTACK ON FOOD FREEDOM (2014), http://ij.org/
images/pdf_folder/economic_liberty/perspectives-food-freedom.pdf [https://perma.cc/4WZU-
H96S]; David J. Berg, Food Choice Is a Fundamental Liberty Right, 9 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 173 (2013); 
Samuel R. Wiseman, Liberty of Palate, 65 ME. L. REV. 737 (2013); Samuel R. Wiseman, The Dangerous 
Right to Food Choice, 38 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 1299 (2015). 
5. Effective in 2010, California Penal Code Section 599f attempted to prohibit: the buying, 
selling, or receiving nonambulatory animals; processing, butchering or selling their meat; or holding 
these animals without humane euthanasia. CAL. PENAL CODE § 599f (West 2010), invalidated by Nat’l 
Meat Ass’n v. Harris (Nat’l Meat Ass’n), 132 S. Ct. 965 (2012). 
6. Made operative in 2012, California Health and Safety Code Section 25981 prohibits force-
feeding a bird for the purpose of “enlarging the bird’s liver.” CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25981 
(2004) (effective Jan. 1, 2005). Section 25982 attempted to prohibit selling any product “in California if 
it is the result of force-feeding a bird for the purpose of enlarging [its liver].” CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY 
CODE § 25982 (2004) (effective Jan. 1, 2005). 
7. Passed in 2011, California Fish and Game Code section 2021(b) prohibits anyone from 
possessing, selling or offering to sell, trade, or distribute a shark fin. CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 
2021(b) (West 2017). 
8. In 2008, California voters voted for Proposition 2, which prohibits cruel confinement of 
farm animals inside California. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION, OFFICIAL 
VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 82 (Aug. 11, 2008). Effective on January 1, 2015 as the Prevention of 
Farm Animal Cruelty Act (codified as amended at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25990–25994 
(2008) (operative Jan. 1, 2015)), Proposition 2 bars housing egg-laying hens in cages that prevent them 
from standing, laying, turning, or extending their limbs fully. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25990; 
see also Alys Masek & Eric. C Surette, 3 CAL. JUR. 3D Animals § 186 (2014). In 2010, the California 
legislature passed AB-1437, which requires out-of-state egg farmers to comply with the requirements 
of Proposition 2 when selling eggs in California. AB-1437, 2009–2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010) 
(codified as amended at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25995 (2010) (effective Jan. 1, 2011);  
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25996 (2010) (amended 2013) (effective Jan. 1, 2014). Its regulations 
are in California Department of Food and Agriculture Shell Egg Food Safety regulation 1350(d).  
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 3, § 1350(d)(1) (2013). 
9. Nat’l Meat Ass’n, 132 S. Ct. at 966 (finding federal meat inspection statutes preempted 
California downer slaughter ban and euthanasia requirements). 
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(2017) (Association des Éleveurs II );10 shark fin in Chinatown Neighborhood Association 
v. Harris (2014);11 and eggs in Missouri v. Harris (2016) (California Egg Case).12 As 
sales bans affecting food industries outside California, it is nearly impossible for 
these policies not to impact interstate commerce. These effects lead to litigation and 
fuel constitutional inquiry about commerce to and from California. Moreover, these 
policies potentially conflict with federal meat and poultry inspections regimes.13 As 
more eaters, voters, and legislators nationwide seek state-level animal welfare 
reforms aimed at food industries, the Constitution becomes the bold menu choice 
to settle debates between animal protection and food.14 
This Article makes two arguments. First, it argues that state policies regulating 
food choices and animal treatment will face judicial inquiry balancing state concerns 
for animal welfare with federal concerns for economic discrimination, regulatory 
uniformity, and costs passed on to eaters and producers. Second, it claims that this 
litigation leads to larger federalism debates, implying political food fights overs state 
measures and eventual federal rules on farm animal treatment. To illustrate this, this 
Article describes California’s four examples of downer pig slaughter, foie gras, shark 
fins, and battery-cage eggs. They exemplify how California passes laws to limit 
animal cruelty on farms and in food industries. Humanitarian objectives motivated 
California to enact these measures. Legal arguments sourced in the Constitution 
inform opposition to these policies. Specifically, Dormant Commerce Clause claims 
argue that state policies on animals and food economically discriminate and are 
protectionist. This federal doctrine’s general objective is to protect interstate 
commerce within the United States. Farmers, restaurants, fishermen, fish 
merchants, butchers, and meat processors have argued that banning food sales 
inside California violates this, whether directed at foie gras, shark fins, or eggs.15 
Next, Supremacy Clause arguments aver that federal laws displace these state 
 
10. Ass’n des Éleveurs de Canards et D’Oies du Québec v. Harris (Ass’n des Éleveurs I ), 729 
F.3d 937, 952 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding California’s ban on foie gras sales did not violate the Dormant 
Commerce Clause), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 398 (2014); Ass’n des Éleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du 
Québec v. Becerra (Ass’n des Éleveurs II ), 870 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 2017) (finding that the Poultry 
Products Inspection Act (PPIA) does not preempt California’s foie gras sales ban), rev’g 79 F. Supp. 3d 
1136 (C.D. Cal. 2015). 
11. Chinatown Neighborhood Ass’n v. Harris, 794 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied,  
No. 15-798, 2016 WL 2945289 (May 23, 2016) (finding California’s ban on possessing or selling shark 
fins did not violate the Dormant Commerce Clause and was not preempted by federal fisheries 
conservation policies). 
12. Missouri ex rel. Koster v. Harris, 847 F.3d 646 (2016); see also Missouri v. Harris, 58  
F. Supp. 3d 1059, 1063 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (finding Missouri and other state plaintiffs lacked standing to 
sue California for its sale ban on battery cage eggs). 
13. See infra Part III.A (discussing the Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) and downer 
slaughter ban) and Part III.B.ii (discussing the Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA) and foie gras sales 
ban). 
14. See Colin Kreuziger, Dismembering the Meat Industry Piece by Piece: The Value of Federalism 
to Farm Animals, 23 L. & INEQ. 363, 376–78 (2005) (describing state efforts to regulate animal 
confinement, slaughter, tail docking, and force-feeding). 
15. See Chinatown Neighborhood Ass’n, 794 F.3d at 1139–40; Ass’n des Éleveurs I, 729 F.3d at 942, 
947. 
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policies as “preempted.” This preemption doctrine identifies when federal statutes 
trump state policies.16 It is argued that federal meat and poultry inspections or 
marine conservation policies displace these Californian measures.17 These four 
California controversies point to a legal debate, pitting “animal protection versus 
food choice” and “state bans versus federal protections for interstate commerce 
and preemption.”  
California’s push to seek food equity, with improved animal welfare, sparks 
federalism contests. This Article refers to “food equity” as “the adverse effects” of 
“food production-related environmental contamination,” involving how animals 
are treated in fishing, slaughter, and farming.18 These moral, humanitarian, and food 
debates are about what can be eaten or sold as food, but these policies engender 
debates about constitutional ordering between state and federal authority. As 
explained below, federal law is relatively “hands-off” for animal treatment on 
farms.19 For this reason, animal advocates seek state-level reforms.20 Federal law 
displaces state policies with doctrines based on the Constitution’s Dormant 
Commerce Clause and Supremacy Clause. Said simply, as states try to protect 
animals, these federal doctrines will be looked at to trump these policies. 
Feeding off this backdrop, this Article provides a working constitutional law 
and policy menu, to make sense of how state concerns for animals shape a food 
equity debate. These contests are slow-cooked and deep in constitutional inquiry. 
California exemplifies a trend that will easily repeat itself in other states. Many states 
have passed or are posed to enact similar animal welfare measures, directed at food 
consumption and food production.21 This will impact farms, ranches, fisheries, and 
 
16. Preemption inquiries also shape how food-labeling requirements are applied. See Sean  
P. Sullivan, Empowering Market Regulation of Agricultural Animal Welfare Through Product Labeling, 19 
ANIMAL L. 391, 399 (2013); Pamela A. Vesilind, Emerging Constitutional Threats to Food Labeling 
Reform, 17 NEXUS 59, 63–64 (2012). 
17. See Nat’l Meat Ass’n, 132 S. Ct. at 968; Chinatown Neighborhood Ass’n, 794 F.3d at 1139; Ass’n 
des Éleveurs II, 870 F.3d at 1147. 
18. This Article uses the examples of California’s four recent measures to predict that state-level 
animal welfare rules applied to food production will create constitutional law controversies, over the 
Dormant Commerce Clause, federal preemption, and state goals of animal protection. Animal welfare 
laws address the “food equity” concern of “protection from food production-related environmental 
contamination,” as defined by this Symposium. UC Irvine School of Law: 2016 Food Equity Symposium, 
U.C. IRVINE SCHOOL OF LAW, http://www.law.uci.edu/events/food-equity/2016/ [https://
perma.cc/43GU-XEX4] (last visited Nov. 9, 2016). 
19. See infra note 29. 
20. See Kreuziger, supra note 14, at 395–401. 
21. For a description of state-level initiatives—voter and legislative—banning gestation crates, 
including Florida’s state constitution litigation and similar bans by Arizona, Oregon, Colorado, and 
California, see SONIA S. WAISMAN ET AL., ANIMAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 400–01 (5th  
ed. 2014). Other examples include an initiative petition in approved in Massachusetts in the November 
2016 election. See Mass., An Act to Prevent Cruelty to Farm Animals, Bill H.3930 189th (2015–2016), 
https://malegislature.gov/Laws/SessionLaws/Acts/2016/Chapter333 [https://perma.cc/K4DZ-
9UWZ]; Andy Rosen, SJC Approves Ballot Question on Cage-free Eggs, THE BOSTON GLOBE ( July 6, 
2016), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2016/07/06/sjc-approves-ballot-question-cage-free-
eggs/jYsOQkFPD1mOUdiksajavO/story.html 
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slaughterhouses as well as food consumption in markets, restaurants, and kitchens. 
Federal law will fuel challenges from farmers, eaters, and food industries. At the risk 
of oversimplifying, the agricultural industry prefers federal law and animal advocates 
and conservationists favor state law.22 Looming constitutional contests brew with a 
national market for food items made from animals and as states try to protect farm 
animals. With animal welfare laws states can change how food is made and what is 
eaten. Specifically, California has tried to improve animal treatment in food 
production with four distinct measures. It passed legislation prohibiting the 
slaughter of downer pigs, also called nonambulatory, which are immobile and 
potentially sick.23 California has banned the sale of foie gras, or liver from force-fed 
ducks.24 Next, it moved to end the market for shark fins, used in celebratory soups 
in Chinese cuisine, by banning the possession or sale of this item.25 Lastly, California 
mandated that eggs, whether from in-state or out-of-state producers, only come 
from hens raised in cages permitting animal movement.26 This effectively bans eggs 
sales from the popular battery cages used in most egg farms throughout the United 
States. California argues that these policies help stop the inhumane treatment of 
pigs in meat production, ducks subjected to cruel force-feeding, wasteful and cruel 
killing of endangered sharks, and egg farming with inhumane hen housing. These 
policies were developed in California with rationalizations determining what can be 
sold as food in California. But, their impact is much wider. They try to influence 
food’s consumption and production outside California with bans on in-state sales 
of items produced outside the state. As legal food fights develop, courts must decide 
if California’s public food choices create barriers to interstate commerce or conflict 
with federal law on meat, poultry, or marine life. 
This Article describes this constitutional food fight, questioning equity for 
animals in food production, and helps make sense of similar measures and expected 
reforms outside California. Part II describes why the subject of animals and food is 
ripe for constitutional inquiry, since federal law is relatively hands-off regulating 
welfare for farm animals. Part III describes California’s recent animal-and-food 
jurisprudence, involving National Meat Association and an attempted state ban on 
the slaughter of nonambulatory animals; Association des Éleveurs regarding the state 
ban on selling foie gras; a state prohibition on possessing or selling shark fins in 
Chinatown Neighborhood Association; and the California Egg Case, which focused on a 
state ban on selling eggs from hens raised in battery cages. 
The following Parts illustrate how courts have sided with state-level animal 
welfare interests for foie gras, shark fins, and eggs. They also show how courts have 
 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20170122040945/https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2016/07/
06/sjc-approves-ballot-question-cage-free-eggs/jYsOQkFPD1mOUdiksajavO/story.html]. 
22. Colin Kreuziger argues that farm advocates should seek reform for animal welfare in state 
and local level legislation. Kreuziger, supra note 14, at 364. 
23. CAL. PENAL CODE § 599f, invalidated by Nat’l Meat Ass’n, 132 S. Ct. 965. 
24. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25982 (West 2010). 
25. CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 2021(b) (West 2013). 
26. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25990–25996 (West 2010). 
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sided with food producers by prioritizing national regulatory uniformity for downer 
slaughter. From these four examples, Part II describes the controversial food item, 
California’s policy, the legal decision, and how courts interpret animals and legal 
protection. Part III identifies two lessons from these food-and-animal welfare cases. 
One regards the political food fight created when states try to protect animals in 
food industries. The second regards a doctrinal jockeying over food-and-animal 
welfare between state authority and potential federal statutes. The Conclusion ends 
by predicting the Constitution’s role in future animal welfare policies. 
I. FEDERAL LAW “HANDS-OFF” FARM ANIMALS INVITES CONSTITUTIONAL 
INQUIRY 
Constitutional law is often taught and interpreted as the body of law that 
orders relationships between the federal government and states, the federal 
government’s branches, and rights in federal law provided to individuals.27 This Part 
identifies constitutional arguments in recent efforts to protect state-level animal 
welfare and federal challenges to them based on the Dormant Commerce and 
preemption doctrines. Importantly, federal law is “hands-off” animal protection in 
farming. This provides the opening for agricultural and food industries to raise 
lawsuits based on these two doctrines. California’s recent food fights suggest that 
food and animal protection will be resolved with constitutional law. Larger moral 
questions about food and animal cruelty will be debated with court examination into 
economic discrimination and who absorbs the costs of improved animal treatment 
(i.e. Dormant Commerce Clause inquiry) and regulatory uniformity (i.e. preemption 
inquiry). Since protections for animals in the food industry likely lead to economic 
costs on farmers and merchants, there are many reasons to challenge these policies. 
Animals are central to farming and many eating practices. An added complexity is 
that animals are often seen as unprotected by constitutional law and liberal legal 
doctrines, which are more focused on legal subjects, rights, and property.28 In sum, 
federal inaction for animal welfare on farms and the general legal status of animals 
fuel current moral debates between animal protection and food freedom. 
Farmers, the food industry, and eaters look to federal law to challenge animal 
welfare innovations passed at the state level. These reforms contrast federal power 
in two important ways. One is that federal law is relatively “hands-off” for animals 
in agriculture. Accordingly, states may break new ground with animal welfare 
reforms. David J. Wolfson and Mariann Sullivan describe animals as practically 
 
27. This definition summarizes Ernest Young’s description of how American constitution law 
generally focuses on the form of the Constitution versus emphasizing what constitutional law does. See 
Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408, 412 (2007). 
28. See generally LAW AND THE QUESTION OF THE ANIMAL: A CRITICAL JURISPRUDENCE 
(Yokiro Otomo & Ed Mussawir eds., 2013) (describing how the notion of animal rights is shaped by 
how humans view animals’ existence in relation to persons and consequentially their status as legal 
subjects); Mariann Sullivan, Consistently Inconsistent: The Constitution and Animals, 19 ANIMAL L. 213 
(2013) (arguing that jurisprudence on animals is inconsistent, both protecting and supporting animal 
harm, because public sentiments regarding animals are similarly irreconcilable). 
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disappearing from federal law.29 They are only protected in very specific and limited 
protections in the Animal Welfare Act (AWA), which is limited to animals in 
research and excludes animals on farms; the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act 
(HMSA), protecting farm animals only when slaughtered and excludes poultry; and 
the Twenty-Eight Hour Law, requiring animals be unloaded while transported for 
long trips and until recently exempting poultry and nontrain travel, e.g. trucks.30 
Animal rights and animal welfare advocates argue that this lack of federal attention 
supplements the cruelty animals suffer due to protections for husbandry customs 
and property rights enjoyed by farmers and ranchers.31 Moreover, industrial 
agriculture interests contest any legislation, state or federal, addressing animal 
welfare in food production.32 Agricultural associations launch lobbying and 
litigation challenges against animal protection.33 Plainly, federal law is unlikely to 
take on the policy objectives California has with bans on downer slaughter, foie gras 
sales, shark fin possession and sales, and battery-cage eggs. 
The second contrast regards how federal law fuels constitutional challenges 
against these state innovations. In these cases, plaintiffs cite impacts on interstate 
commerce or conflict with federal statutes. Dormant Commerce Clause claims have 
been argued by foie gras farmers from New York and Canada in Association des 
Éleveurs, fish merchants in Chinatown Neighborhood Association, and six states noting 
economic losses for their egg farmers in the California Egg Case.34 Also, food 
industry litigants raise preemption claims. Federal law has been argued as displacing 
 
29. David J. Wolfson & Mariann Sullivan, Foxes in the Hen House: Animals, Agribusiness, and 
the Law: A Modern American Fable, in ANIMAL RIGHTS: CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS 
205, 206–09 (Cass R. Sunstein & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2004).  
30. Wolfson & Sullivan, supra note 29, at 206–09. The AWA has been enacted as sections 2131 
to 2159 of Title 7 of the U.S. Code. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131–2159 (2012). The Twenty-Eight Hour Law 
has been enacted as section 80502 of Title 49 of the U.S. Code. See 49 U.S.C. § 80502 (2012). The 
HMSA enacted at sections 1901–1907 of Title 7 of the U.S. Code. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1907 (2012). 
For descriptions of how the AWA does not apply to farm animals, see 11 NEIL E. HARL, 
AGRICULTURAL LAW § 87.02, LEXIS (database updated 2017). 
31. See Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction: What are Animal Rights?, in ANIMAL RIGHTS: CURRENT 
DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS 3, 11 (Cass R. Sunstein & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2004) 
(describing how when animals are viewed as property, their rights and status before the law is severely 
limited). See generally Pamela Vesilind, Animal Husbandry Redux: Redefining “Accepted Agricultural 
Practices” for Locally Sourced Food, 28 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Fall 2013, at 37 (describing how 
husbandry practices provide industrial agricultural ways to treat animals inhumanely). 
32. For descriptions of how industrial agriculture benefits from excluding animals from welfare 
protection measures, see David N. Cassuto, Meat Animals, Humane Standards and other Legal Fictions, 
10 L. CULTURE & HUMAN. 225 (2014); Note, Challenging Concentration of Control in the American  
Meat Industry, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2643 (2004). Tadlock Cowan writes that for federal animal 
protections in agriculture, Congress prefers voluntary versus regulatory measures. See TADLOCK 
COWAN, CONG. RES. SERV., RS21978, HUMANE TREATMENT OF FARM ANIMALS: OVERVIEW AND 
ISSUES (2011). 
33. Id. 
34. Ass’n des Éleveurs I, 729 F.3d at 947; Chinatown Neighborhood Ass’n, 794 F.3d 1136; Missouri, 58 
F. Supp. 3d 1059. 
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California’s downer policies the Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA),35 foie gras 
sales ban by the Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA),36 and shark fin ban by 
federal fish conservation programs.37 Pork product sellers in National Meat 
Association, foie gras growers in Association des Éleveurs II, and fish merchants in 
Chinatown Neighborhood Association argued this, respectively.38 Given federal 
inattention to animal cruelty on farms and the national impacts of sales bans on 
food items, the Dormant Commerce and preemption doctrines are the legal 
instruments used to try to roll back animal protections in food production and food 
sales. 
Dormant Commerce claims derive from the Constitution’s affirmative grant 
that the federal government has exclusive power “to regulate Commerce . . . among 
several States,” called the Commerce Clause.39 Sometimes referred to as the 
Negative Commerce, Dormant Commerce doctrine operates as a limitation on 
states enacting laws that impose substantial burdens on interstate commerce.40 They 
are presented as “dormant” since Congress is argued to have the power to regulate 
this commerce but has not passed legislation to that effect. State policies impact this 
silence or inaction of the federal government. Importantly, the Dormant Commerce 
Clause seeks to protect the market and market participants, trying to guard the 
domestic free flow of goods and services across state borders in the United States. 
Mostly, this focuses on striking state laws that discriminate against out-of-state 
actors, favor in-state actors, or unduly burden interstate commerce. 
Preemption doctrine is derived from the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause, 
stating that “the Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the 
Land.”41 In its simplest incarnation, federal preemption inquiry can look at 
Congress’s explicit intent to displace state legislation or to its explicit intent to save 
these state measures.42 Many times though, this area of law is more complex, with 
states increasingly passing laws in subject areas where the federal government also 
regulates, and vice versa; the federal government has moved into fields that state 
authorities have occupied. Likewise, federal statutes may be passed without an 
explicit statement to displace state legislation. 
There are three kinds of federal preemption: expressed, field, and conflict.43 
Expressed preemption looks at when Congress has explicitly stated it intends to 
 
35. Nat’l Meat Ass’n, 132 S. Ct. at 968. See generally Federal Meat Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 
601–695 (2012). 
36. Ass’n des Éleveurs II, 870 F.3d at 1146–53.  
37. Chinatown Neighborhood Ass’n, 794 F.3d at 1140. 
38. Nat’l Meat Ass’n, 132 S. Ct. at 970; Chinatown Neighborhood Ass’n, 794 F.3d at 1140–41; Ass’n 
des Éleveurs II, 870 F.3d 1140. 
39. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
40. See Nat’l Ass’n of Optometrists & Opticians, 682 F.3d at 1147. 
41. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
42. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2500–01 (2012); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 
U.S. 470, 485 (1986). 
43. These categories were generally described in Louisiana Public Service Commission v. Federal 
Communications Commission, 476 U.S. 355, 368–69 (1986). The Court has also explained that these 
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displace state law. Federal statutes will have an expressed preemption clause that a 
court examines. Often this inquiry focuses on whether the state measure is within 
the scope of the federal preemption clause. The next category, field preemption, is 
applied when there is no preemption clause in the federal statute. For this, courts 
look to whether federal regulation in the area is so pervasive that it is reasonable to 
infer that Congress did not leave room for state involvement. This inquiry often 
emphasizes the federal interest in the field of regulation. Also applicable when there 
is no preemption clause, conflict preemption examines if a party can comply with 
both federal and state requirements. When a party cannot comply with both, or 
when state compliance is an obstacle to federal objectives, a state law will be 
trumped by conflict preemption. 
In sum, with these two doctrines, Dormant Commerce and preemption, eaters 
and food industries try to strike state animal welfare laws. Constitutional law enters 
the fray after voters, eaters, animal advocates, environmentalists, and state 
legislators move to curb alleged abuses in food production and food consumption. 
II. CALIFORNIA PROTECTS ANIMALS AND HEATS CONSTITUTIONAL INQUIRY 
This Article next examines the Constitution’s recent path in litigation about 
California’s animal welfare policies since 2008. Jonathan Lovvorn and Nancy Perry, 
Vice-Presidents of the Humane Society of the United States (HSUS), referred to 
this year as a “watershed moment for animal law” when voters approved 
Proposition 2.44 The Proposition was a turning point in the HSUS campaign for 
minimal humane standards for farm animals. Lovvorn and Perry explain how 
Proposition 2, also known as the Farm Animal Cruelty Act, coincided with cattle 
slaughter, beef recall scandals, and the looming enforcement of a ban on foie gras. 
Proposition 2 did not just lead to enacting a new set of animal cruelty rules for farms 
in the nation’s most populous and economically powerful state with a leading 
agricultural sector. More importantly, it signaled a “seismic shift in public attitudes 
towards animals raised for food.”45 California is not so much a leader in these new 
public perceptions, but its actions reflect what many states have been doing with 
animal welfare regulations applied to farming.46 Animal welfare is posed to 
increasingly regulate what Americans eat as and what is produced as food. Because 
 
categories are not rigid. See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 n.6 (2000) 
(quoting English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 n.5 (1990)). 
44. Jonathan R. Lovvorn & Nancy V. Perry, California Proposition 2: A Watershed Moment for 
Animal Law, 15 ANIMAL L. 149, 150 (2009). 
45. See id. at 150. 
46. California is often seen as the vanguard in food developments, in terms of agriculture, eating 
trends, and state regulations. See generally Baylen J. Linnekin, The “California Effect” & the Future of 
American Food: How California’s Growing Crackdown on Food & Agriculture Harms the State & the 
Nation, 13 CHAP. L. REV. 357 (2010); JOYCE GOLDSTEIN WITH DORE BROWN, INSIDE THE 
CALIFORNIA FOOD REVOLUTION: THIRTY YEARS THAT CHANGED OUR CULINARY 
CONSCIOUSNESS (2013). 
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these trends occur at the state level, they marinate as constitutional legal questions, 
potentially clashing with interstate commerce and federal law. 
In short, California represents a new popularity and political viability for public 
rules focused on animals in food production. In policy terms, these safeguards for 
animals, derived out of concern for cruelty and animal conservation, include bans 
directed at four things: downer animals, foie gras, shark fins, and battery-cage eggs. 
These bans achieved two important things in California: they eliminated distinct 
methods of food production, and made it illegal to commercially sell products from 
these methods. This second point is directed at activities outside California. It 
reflects California’s specific goals to eliminate the economic incentives to continue 
the four allegedly cruel practices. It is argued by some food producers that their 
illegality in California will help eliminate these practices nationwide.47 These 
commercial impacts fuel Dormant Commerce and preemption doctrine disputes, 
with out-of-state food producers looking to the Constitution to contest California 
in court. Farming industries rely on decades of environmental and animal cruelty 
norms being hands-off federal law. The four legal fights described below set the 
table for how big agriculture will fight animal welfare rules in the future. With this 
backdrop, this Part describes the policies, constitutional litigation, and legal results 
of California banning A) downer slaughter; B) the practice of force-feeding ducks 
to create foie gras and the sale of foie gras; C) commerce in or possession of shark 
fins; and D) battery-cage housing for hens on egg farms. 
A. Downer Slaughter: Federal Inspections Displace California Swine Protections 
California’s efforts to require humane animal slaughter provide this Article’s 
first example of questioning animal welfare’s constitutional legality. In National 
Meat Association v. Harris, the Supreme Court affirmed that the FMIA displaces 
California’s animal welfare measures. This prioritizes uniform national meat 
inspection regulations over state interests in humane swine slaughtering. A complex 
debate over intricate statute distinctions, between California’s criminal law and 
federal meat inspections, reflect this judicial balancing, ultimately siding against 
state-level animal welfare. 
This Section presents this dissonance between California’s efforts for 
improved animal welfare and existing federal authority. This illuminates why a 
simple preemption case, purportedly about a meat inspection statute and state-level 
conflict, reflects a larger constitutional debate about animals welfare, food, and 
states’ rights. For this, the Section first describes the political and popular attention 
motivating a ban on downer slaughter and California’s attempt to regulate this with 
criminal law. This provides a backdrop to then identify the larger and brewing 
constitutional controversy subtly appearing in the unanimous decision in National 
Meat Association. 
 
47. See Linnekin, supra note 46, at 363–67. 
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The context for National Meat Association began on January 1, 2010 when 
California’s ban on slaughtering downer animals became effective with California 
Penal Code Section 599(f ).48 This section applied to nonambulatory animals, also 
called downers, who are “unable to stand and walk without assistance.”49 It 
prohibited buying, selling, or receiving a nonambulatory animal as well as processing 
or selling the meat or products of such animal.50 Furthermore, it mandated that 
slaughterhouses take “immediate action to humanely euthanize” animals that have 
become nonambulatory after their arrival.51 California’s ban focused on the 
operation or process of a particular type of slaughter. These California regulations 
contrast federal measures. Federal law permits in certain instances meat can be sold 
from these slaughters.52 In short, California prohibits an action and federal law 
protects the potential sale of an item resulting from the action. 
Pamela Vesilind describes downers as animals that have passed visual 
inspection by the U.S. Department of Agriculture Federal Food Safety Inspection 
Service (FSIS) upon initial arrival at a facility.53 Downers are unable to move or are 
lame due to exhaustion or a fractured bone.54 California passed this measure after 
the public controversy of the Hallmark/Westland slaughter facility in Chino, 
California.55 Humane Society investigators released reports of downer cows at this 
facility unable to move along the slaughter line being rammed by forklifts, jabbed 
in the eye, shocked electrically, and sprayed with high-pressure water.56 These 
actions were taken to ensure the cows were slaughtered. This avoided economic 
losses from line removal. 
Adding to these cruelty concerns, downer cows may be inflicted with Bovine 
Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE or “mad cow disease”).57 Eventually, these 
images led to public outcry and the largest meat recall in American history, since 
Hallmark/Westland was the second-largest supplier of meat to the National School 
Lunch Program.58 While this controversy involved cattle, California’s downer 
slaughter ban that was passed in 2009 applied to cattle, swine, sheep, and goats.59 
Federal regulations prohibit downer cattle slaughter,60 but the California ban went 
 
48. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 599f (West 2010 & Supp. 2016), invalidated by Nat’l Meat Ass’n, 132 
S. Ct. 965. 
49. Id. § 599f(i). 
50. Id. § 599f(a)–(b). 
51. Id. § 599f(c). 
52. See Nat’l Meat Ass’n, 132 S. Ct. at 969. 
53. See Pamela Vesilind, Preempting Humanity: Why National Meat Ass’n v. Harris Answered the 
Wrong Question, 65 ME. L. REV. 685, 690 (2013). 
54. See id. 
55. See Lovvorn & Perry, supra note 44, at 156–58. 
56. See id. 
57. See Vesilind, supra note 53, at 690–91. 
58. See Nancy Perry & Peter Brandt, A Case Study on Cruelty to Farm Animals: Lessons Learned 
from the Hallmark Meat Packing Case, 106 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 117, 119 (2008). 
59. CAL. PENAL CODE § 599f(j) (West 2010), invalidated by Nat’l Meat Ass’n, 132 S. Ct. 965. 
60. See 9 C.F.R. § 309.3(e) (2016). For a description of how “young calves” have been exempted 
from this ban on cattle downer slaughter and other federal and state downer regulations, see Animal 
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further than just cows. Federal slaughter regulations, applied to cattle and swine, are 
contained in the meat inspection regime, enforced by FSIS.61 
Pork farmers and pork product sellers stood to lose a great deal from 
California’s downer slaughter ban.62 Downer swine account for .05 to 1% of the 
pigs that make it to a pork processing plant.63 From a cruelty perspective, animal 
advocates argued that nonambulatory animals should not be killed and processed 
into meat.64 These swine are sick and it is inhumane to kill them. Federal law 
requires the humane slaughter of pigs and other animals, but enforcement of these 
measures is often seen as lacking.65 
Concerns for mad cow disease motivate the California and existing federal 
slaughter bans on cattle. But for swine, health concerns are not so clear. Research 
shows that downer pigs result in pork meat of lower quality.66 Removing downers 
from the slaughter line is viewed as an enormous economic loss, since downer pigs 
are fully matured at this point. Taking them off the line eliminates most commercial 
options for which the animal had been raised and cared for. From a critical 
perspective, others argue that swine are raised in unhealthy and weak conditions to 
decrease production costs and increase profits. Docile pigs are easier to care for and 
can be raised in larger numbers. When downers arrive at the slaughterhouse, they 
are not an aberration, but actually the result of industrial objectives to keep the 
animals weak and easy to raise in feed lots.67 
In 2012’s National Meat Association, the Supreme Court unanimously held that 
California’s ban on downer slaughter was preempted by the FMIA.68 Seen in 
preemption terms, the decision was a small but direct way for federal law to displace 
state-level policy regulating humane animal slaughter.69 The Court interpreted the 
 
Welfare Inst., Legal Protection for Nonambulatory (or “Downed”) Animals (2014), https://awionline.org/
sites/default/files/uploads/documents/fa-legalprotectionsfordownedanimals-12262013.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/L5FZ-HX6W]. 
61. For a description of how FSIS enforces meat inspection and humane methods of slaughter, 
see GEOFFREY S. BECKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22819, USDA MEAT INSPECTION AND 
HUMANE METHODS OF SLAUGHTER ACT (2008). 
62. Vesilind explains that downers are usually the result of objectives to maximize meat 
production. Vesilind, supra note 53, at 690. 
63. See S.N. Carr et al., A Survey of Pork Quality of Downer Pigs, 16 J. MUSCLE FOODS 298 
(2005). 
64. See Lovvorn & Perry, supra note 44, at 156–58. See generally PERRY & BRANDT, supra note 
130; Marya Torrez, Health and Welfare Preempted: How National Meat Association v. Harris Undermines 
Federalism, Food Safety, and Animal Protection, 10 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 35, 61–63 (2014). 
65. See Bruce Friedrich, Note, When the Regulators Refuse to Regulate, Pervasive USDA 
Underenforcement of the Humane Slaughter Act, 104 GEO. L.J. 197, 204 (2015); Emma Burgess Roy, 
Note, Cruelty on Your Plate: The Misadministration of the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act, 3 MID-
ATL. J. ON L. & PUB. POL’Y 104–06 (2015). 
66. See generally Carr et al., supra note 63, at 301–03. 
67. Cf. Andrea M. Repphun, Pigs-In-A-Blanket: How Current Meat Inspection Regulations Wrap 
America in False Security, 16 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 183, 201–02 (2011). 
68. See Nat’l Meat Ass’n, 132 S. Ct. at 967. 
69. For descriptions of scope of the FMIA and its preemption clause, see NEIL E. HARL, supra 
note 30, §§ 65.01–65.02. 
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FMIA broadly and clearly, with no dissent or competing interpretations by the 
justices. The National Meat Association court presents governmental authority as 
plainly delineated. This regards state-level authority and federal statutes enforced by 
the FSIS. This clarity dissipates when the holding is interpreted in light of animal 
welfare law’s muted, if not negated, role in agriculture and food production. 
California’s attempt to guarantee humane slaughter of swine ran into not only the 
FMIA, but the larger discord with federal law’s “hands-off” approach to animals in 
agriculture. 
In 2008, California passed measures banning nonambulatory animal 
slaughter.70 It amended the California Penal Code, Section 599(f ), to require two 
things: a prohibition on downer slaughter, and humane euthanasia of any downer 
animal on the slaughter line.71 Specifically, this barred any selling, buying, receiving, 
processing, or butchering of a product from a downer animal.72 Also, it required 
immediate removal of these animals from the slaughter line and required them to 
be euthanized.73 The provision banned any holding on to a “nonambulatory animal 
without taking immediate action to humanely euthanize the animal.”74 Any 
infraction of these provisions could lead to a one-year jail sentence and $20,000 
fine. 
Quickly, a group of meatpackers and processors filed suit against California 
to enjoin enforcement of these provisions.75 Eventually, the Supreme Court ruled 
against California and for the meatpackers finding FMIA Section 678 preempts 
state law.76 Specifically, it noted that the FMIA barred “additional or different” state 
regulations regarding the “premises, facilities, or operations” mentioned in the 
FMIA.77 With the goals of safe meat production and humane slaughtering, Congress 
had passed the FMIA in 1906 in response to public outcry following various 
meatpacking controversies mentioned in the book The Jungle.78 The FMIA had been 
amended in 1958 with the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act (HMSA).79 This 
regulatory scheme was expansive and offered little room for conflict by additional 
or different state requirements.80 
 
70. Nat’l Meat Ass’n v. Brown, 599 F.3d 1093, 1096 (9th Cir. 2010). 
71. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 599f(a)–(c) (West 2010), invalidated by Nat’l Meat Ass’n, 132  
S. Ct. 965. 
72. See CAL. PENAL CODE §599f(a) (barring slaughterhouses and other food sellers from 
buying, selling, or receiving); CAL. PENAL CODE §599f(b) (barring slaughterhouses from processing, 
butchering or selling meat or productions of nonambulatory animals). 
73. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 599f(c). 
74. Id. 
75. Nat’l Meat Ass’n, 132 S. Ct. at 970. 
76. Id. at 975. 
77. Id. at 970. 
78. Id. at 968. 
79. Id. (referring to HMSA, 72 Stat. 862, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1901–07). 
80. See id. at 969. 
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California’s ban on using downer animals and its euthanasia requirement 
created a new regulatory scheme.81 This conflicted with Congress’s mandated 
requirements for downer and its expressed intent to displace state regulation in this 
area.82 The specific difference between California and federal requirements involved 
what could be done with the nonambulatory animal. The FMIA allows for downer 
animals to be classified as “U.S. Suspect,” by the FSIS, and separated for a 
postmortem exam, but not taken off the line.83 They are slaughtered and then their 
carcass is inspected by an FSIS inspector. If the inspector looks at the carcass and 
deems the downer unsafe, then, it will be classified as “U.S. Condemned.”84 This 
classification removes them from being processed or sold for consumption. 
This is quite different than what California tried to do. California Penal Code 
Section 599(f ) tried to mandate no use of the downer animal and its required 
euthanasia.85 The Court described this as a new regulatory regime and in conflict 
with the FMIA.86 The California position would bar any use of the animal, arguing 
it is unsafe and inhumane to slaughter them. The FMIA reflected a different 
position.87 It looked at downer animals not always as unsafe and that for many 
reasons they could be immobile at this point. Post-death examinations allow for 
inspectors to determine if there is health concern for human consumption from the 
animal. Similarly, California argued that it was inhumane to slaughter or eat these 
animals. The FMIA allowed for a further step of inspection before condemning the 
animal. 
The Supreme Court’s view that the FMIA and the California provision 
conflicted in terms of “operations” differed greatly from how the lower court saw 
the issue.88 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found the FMIA 
inapplicable, focusing on what becomes destined to be slaughtered or not.89 
Authored by Judge Kozinski, the appellate opinion in National Meat Association saw 
no express preemption in the FMIA.90 It viewed California’s ban and euthanasia 
requirements as taking animals off the slaughter line. Since it removed what would 
be slaughtered and could be inspected, the FMIA was inapplicable. California’s 
requirements were viewed as doing something before the FMIA applies. Animal 
welfare advocates have agreed with this lower courts approach, arguing that the 
FMIA provides a minimum level of regulation that states can add to. 
 
81. See id. at 970. 
82. Id. 
83. See Nat’l Meat Ass’n, 132 S. Ct. at 969; see also Vesilind, supra note 53, at 690–91 (describing 
the FSIS inspection process at a slaughter facility). 
84. Nat’l Meat Ass’n, 132 S. Ct. at 968. 
85. Id. at 970–71. 
86. Id. at 970. 
87. Id. at 971–72. 
88. See id. at 972. 
89. Nat’l Meat Ass’n v. Brown, 599 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir., 2010). 
90. Id. at 1096. 
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The Supreme Court’s holding in National Meat Association points to the 
conflict that exists between federal laws and state efforts to improve animal welfare. 
Here, a federal statute is seen as having wide-reaching coverage. It regards humane 
slaughter and meat safety with Congress’s intention to expressly preempt state law. 
While on the losing side of the debate, a state, California in this example, attempted 
to craft protections for animals. 
In sum, California’s efforts to prohibit nonambulatory slaughter lose out to 
federal law as a result of the Supremacy Clause. From an animal and food 
perspective, National Meat Association illustrates that federal preemption doctrine 
can displace the humanitarian objectives of state law to stop the slaughter of sick 
swine. In this case, expressed preemption ruled out the lower court’s view that 
federal meat inspection statutes only apply to animals that will be killed for meat.91 
State criminal law was interpreted as in conflict with a federal regime focused on 
meat safety and humanitarian slaughter. For animal welfare advocates and states, 
the only way to overcome this federal bar would be to seek a legislative change at 
the federal level, limiting the FMIA’s preemption clause’s reach. With National Meat 
Association’s ruling, pig farmers and the meat industry would be less vulnerable to 
the economic loss of a downer animal taken off the slaughter line, months after 
being raised, fed, housed, and transported. In animal welfare terms, the FMIA and 
the Supreme Court do not regard the bar on downer slaughter as an issue for state 
authority once an animal reaches the slaughterhouse. Conceivably, downer 
protections could be implemented before then. In terms of food production, 
National Meat Association shows how states cannot prohibit an operation or a 
process ultimately resulting in food that federal law authorizes and intentionally 
preempts. In short, when animal welfare conflicts with federal norms on meat 
inspection, state law must cede. This ultimately prioritizes regulatory uniformity 
over state interest in stopping cruelty directed at downers. 
B. Foie Gras: A Sales Ban Does Not Discriminate and Does Not  
Conflict with Federal Requirements 
Foie gras serves as this Article’s second example of a constitutional 
questioning of California’s animal welfare policies, with lawsuits challenging the law 
on Dormant Commerce Clause and then preemption grounds.92 In terms of the 
Dormant Commerce clause, courts have found the California’s sales ban on foie 
gras does not discriminate, since Californian and non-Californian purveyors are 
 
91. See id. 
92. Soon after California passed its foie gras ban, legal scholarship began predicting if the ban 
was legal or not under dormant commerce clause grounds. See generally Alexandra R. Harrington, Not 
All It’s Quacked Up To Be: Why State and Local Efforts to Ban Foie Gras Violate Constitutional Law, 
12 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L 303, 318–19 (2007) (arguing that the attempts to ban foie gras contained in foie 
gras legislation constitute violations of the Dormant Commerce Clause, and the policy behind these 
bans does not fall within the zone of protected legislative activity), Erica Williams Morris, Note, Foie 
Gras Ban in California, 45 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 5 (2014) (suggesting that plaintiff in Ass’n des 
Eleveurs I, 729 F.3d 947, could have succeeded with a Commerce Clause argument). 
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subject to the same bar. For this doctrine, courts have sided with California’s efforts 
to protect animals from alleged cruel treatment in feeding.93 The U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has also sided with California finding no preemption 
in the PPIA.94 
In 2004, California made foie gras effectively illegal in the state, by banning 
force-feeding of a bird to enlarge its liver and by prohibiting the sale of any product 
resulting from force-feeding. Foie gras is made by feeding a duck or goose to the 
point that its liver grows greatly, developing complex proteins affecting its flavor. 
Foie gras is a product steeped in centuries of history, described by food writers in 
ancient Egypt and valued as an expensive delicacy.95 In North America, foie gras 
producers raise ducks and not geese. The Israeli Supreme Court has also prohibited 
foie gras production.96 But these efforts have not prohibited the sale of foie gras. 
Recently in the United States, foie gras has been the subject of myriad debates in 
court, with animal rights groups arguing it is a diseased (adulterated) product97 or 
unlawfully sold when served off the menu.98 In 2006, Chicago banned the sale of 
foie gras, which the city council eventually repealed in 2008.99 Interest groups trying 
to preserve foie gras, mostly farmers and restaurants, also argue that California’s 
efforts violate due process standards since its prohibition has vague requirements.100 
California argues that it merely prohibits force-feeding, which is a process, and that 
foie gras as fattened liver can still be sold or possessed.101 Legal contests over foie 
gras in California have an extended history. Hillary Dixler charts a decade of these 
disputes in the state, including animal cruelty, breach of contract, meat labeling, and 
 
93. See Ass’n des Éleveurs I, 729 F.3d at 952. 
94. See  Ass’n des Éleveurs II, 870 F.3d at 1148. 
95. See MARK CARO, THE FOIE GRAS WARS: HOW A 5,000-YEAR-OLD DELICACY INSPIRED 
THE WORLD’S FIERCEST FOOD FIGHT 23–33 (2009); MICHAEL GINOR ET AL., FOIE GRAS: A 
PASSION 2–3 (1999). 
96. For description of the Israeli Supreme Court banning foie gras, see Mariann Sullivan & 
David J. Wolfson, What’s Good for the Goose . . . The Israeli Supreme Court, Foie Gras, and the Future 
of Farmed Animals in the United States, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 2007, at 139, 143–54. 
97. See Animal Legal Def. Fund v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., No. 2:12-cv-4028-ODW(PJWx), 2013 
WL 1191736, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2013) (finding foie gras not adulterated per PPIA), rev’d & 
remanded, 632 F. App’x 905 (9th Cir. 2015); see also Stephen Wells, The Only Thing Unadulterated About 
Foie Gras is the Cruelty, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 5, 2015, 8:50 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
stephen-wells/only-thing-unadulterated-about-foie-gras-cruelty_b_8474728.html [https://perma.cc/ 
R5K5-RM38]. 
98. See Animal Legal Def. Fund v. LT Napa Partners LLC, 234 Cal. App. 4th 1270, 1275 (2015). 
99. See Ill. Rest. Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 492 F. Supp. 2d 891, 892 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (finding  
no economic discrimination and thus no dormant commerce clause violation). See generally  
Michaela DeSoucey, “Ducking” the Foie Gras Ban: Dinner and a Side of Politics in Chicago, in 
POLITISCHE MAHLZEITEN: POLITICAL MEALS 81 (Regina F. Bendix & Michaela Fenske eds., 2014), 
http://ncsu.academia.edu/MichaelaDeSoucey [https://perma.cc/5KHV-9XX3] (examining the chef 
and eater protests of the Chicago ban); Joshua I. Grant, Hell to the Sound of Trumpets: Why Chicago’s 
Ban on Foie Gras Was Constitutional and What It Means for the Future of Animal Welfare Laws, 2  
STAN. J. ANIMAL L. & POL’Y 52 (2009) (providing history of the product, description of Chicago’s 
policy, and Dormant Commerce Clause analysis). 
100. See Ass’n des Éleveurs I, 729 F.3d at 946–47. 
101. Id. at 944. 
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consumer law claims, along with concurrent advocacy and reform efforts 
nationwide.102 
This Article focuses on Dormant Commerce Clause and preemption 
arguments in foie gras litigation, since they reflect similar trends in other animal and 
food cases. Moreover, courts primarily focus on these issues about competing 
federal and state authority. Before examining these doctrinal debates, this Section 
first describes California’s foie gras ban, then foie gras as a food item, and the 
arguments in support and against its prohibition. Finally, this Section presents the 
legal debate posed by the ban. Importantly, California’s efforts to ban foie gras have 
been seen by courts as focused on the process of force-feeding and on the ingredient 
derived from ducks. Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence has found the ban 
legal since it only focuses on the activity of force-feeding and does not ban foie gras 
made without force-feeding.103 Likewise, preemption jurisprudence has found 
federal poultry inspection requirements do not trump California’s foie gras sales 
ban.104 
California’s prohibition on foie gras comes from relatively simple changes to 
the California Health and Safety Code. In 2004, the California legislature passed 
Sections 25981 and 25982, banning force-feeding birds and sales of products from 
this force-feeding, respectively.105 Section 25981 merely states a “person may not 
force feed a bird for the purpose of enlarging the bird’s liver beyond normal size.”106 
Section 25982 adds that “a product may not be sold in California if it is the result 
of force feeding a bird for the purpose of enlarging the bird’s liver beyond normal 
size.”107 Section 25980 defines “force feeding” as a “process that causes the bird to 
consume more food” than it would “voluntarily,” and includes but is not limited to 
“delivering feed through a tube or other device inserted into the bird’s 
esophagus.”108 The definition of a bird includes but is not limited to a duck or 
goose.109 A period of seven and a half years was allotted by the legislature between 
January 1, 2005, and July 1, 2012, when California’s foie gras bans became 
operative.110 The legislature did this to allow “agricultural practices that include 
raising and selling force fed birds” to be modified.111 
These provisions effectively made standard foie gras consumption and 
production illegal in California. The only way to either produce or sell foie gras in 
the state would be if a bird was not force-fed. If birds voluntarily consumed enough 
 
102. Hillary Dixler, The Decade-Long Foie Gras Fight, Explained, EATER ( Jan. 9, 2015),  
http://www.eater.com/2015/1/9/7513743/foie-gras-ban-california-history-appeal-peta-aldf [https:// 
perma.cc/99JK-FTTL]. 
103. See Ass’n des Éleveurs I, 729 F.3d at 949–50. 
104. See Ass’n des Éleveurs II, 870 F.3d at 1146. 
105. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25981 (West 2010); id. § 25982. 
106. Id. § 25981. 
107. Id. § 25982. 
108. Id. § 25980(b). 
109. Id. § 25980(a). 
110. Id. §§ 25984(a)–(c). 
111. Id. § 25984(c). 
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to enlarge their liver, that would be conceivably legal under California’s new 
changes.112 This policy was not a surprise when passed; it had been the concerted 
effort of animal rights groups in California, nationwide, and overseas. Moreover, 
the new policy provided substantial time, seven and half years, for farmers and 
sellers to adapt their businesses. When the changes were passed, there was one foie 
gras farmer in California. It became the subject of much litigation and legal 
attention, went out of business after the ban.113 Foie gras farmers still heavily invest 
in successful operations in New York and Canada, making these California 
provisions legal concerns for out-of-state growers, in-state eaters and sellers, and 
interstate commerce. 
Foie gras is an extremely controversial food item. In 2013, the Ninth Circuit 
attempted an objective description of the feeding process.114 It notes that ducks 
grow fully in eleven to thirteen weeks, developing in four feeding stages.115 In the 
first three stages of growth, the ducks are fed pellets. In the first stage, for four 
weeks right after birth, the ducks eat pellets available to them in pans twenty-four 
hours a day.116 In the second stage, for one or two month(s), the pellet varieties 
change but are still accessible all day and night.117 In the third stage, for two weeks, 
ducks eat pellets “at only certain times during the day,” with the farmer choosing 
eating times.118 For the final and most controversial stage, called gavage, the ducks 
are “hand-fed by feeders who use ‘a tube to deliver the feed to the crop sac at the 
base of the duck’s esophagus.’”119 Gavage lasts between ten and thirteen days. This 
last stage, a fraction of the duck’s life, feeds the complex debates on animal cruelty 
and the consequent conflicts on federal and state authority. 
Foie gras defenders praise its rich and unique taste, gastronomic importance 
as a luxurious item emphasizing an animal’s physical ability to prepare for seasons.120 
 
112. Gaining much food and news notoriety, a farm in Spain has succeeded in producing foie 
gras without force-feeding. See Dan Barber, The Farmer Who Makes “Ethical” Foie Gras, GUARDIAN 
( Jan. 18, 2015, 4:30 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/18/the-farmer-who-
makes-ethical-foie-gras [https://perma.cc/ZE6Y-G79X]. 
113. Sonoma Foie Gras is owned by Guillermo Gonzalez. For his description of intimidation 
by animal rights advocates and unfulfilled promises by California to research cruelty-free foie gras 
production, see Ryan Maxey, In the Words of a Foie Gras Farmer: An Interview with Guillermo Gonzalez 
of Sonoma Artisan Foie Gras, SFGATE: INSIDE SCOOP SF ( June 29, 2012, 11:37 AM), http://
insidescoopsf.sfgate.com/blog/2012/06/29/in-the-words-of-a-foie-gras-farmer-an-interview-with-
guillermo-gonzalez-of-sonoma-artisan-foie-gras/ [https://perma.cc/V9RV-TJ5S]. For recent news 
about the farm’s reemergence, see Jay Weston, The Inside Story How Foie Gras Returned to California!, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 24, 2015, 3:51 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jay-weston/the-
inside-story-how-foie_b_7126660.html [https://perma.cc/PV9M-K3J2]. 
114. See Ass’n des Éleveurs I, 729 F.3d at 942. 
115. Id. at 942, 946. 
116. Id. at 942. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. 
120. For a succinct defense of foie gras, see Top 5 Facts About Foie Gras, ARTISAN FARMERS 
ALLIANCE, http://www.artisanfarmers.org/factsaboutfoiegras.html [https://perma.cc/S3AW-
FAGD] (last visited July 5, 2016). 
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It is a reminder of meat eating before refrigeration and chemical preservation. Since 
ducks and geese are not endangered, foie gras bans are argued to force-feed 
morality.121 One of foie gras’s most vocal defenders in the United States, Michael 
Ginor, founder of Hudson Valley Foie Gras, is a litigant in the most recent cases 
against California. Ginor explains in the book Foie Gras: A Passion that a goose or 
duck is different than a human and their anatomy is different, for example, geese 
and ducks are particular prepared for long migrations.122 For this reason, the birds 
naturally enlarge their liver after gorging on food. Foie gras defenders also argue 
that the bird naturally has a different gag-reflex than humans, with its throats and 
digestive system allowing eating fish and other items whole.123 For this reason, tubes 
used to force-feed are not cruel to the birds. Poultry researchers add that 
examinations of bird hormone levels show no stress from force-feeding and that 
since an enlarged liver is reversible the condition is not a disease.124 
Foie gras critics see the animal as suffering from force-feeding and offer 
various ethical and physiological arguments against gavage.125 They argue that the 
feeding with a tube inserted down the bird causes injuries to their throats and 
digestive organs. Furthermore, they claim that this force-feeding causes suffering to 
the bird, evident in their walking, breathing, standing, and effects on their joints, 
feet, and skin. Next, it is alleged that the birds develop a variety of diseases and 
injuries to their respiratory and digestive system.126 This results in a high rate of 
mortality for birds subjected to gavage. 
These culinary, farming practices, ethical, and animal welfare arguments feed 
debates on whether prohibitions on foie gras are legal. Larger concerns shape these 
attitudes as well, regarding governmental intervention in choosing what we may eat 
and the agriculture industry’s suspicion of regulation, especially regarding animal 
welfare. With this context, in foie gras disputes, courts do not directly examine what 
is cruel or permitted in force-feeding birds. Instead, bans are viewed as potentially 
illegal because of their impact on state and federal authority. 
1. The Ban Does Not Discriminate Against Out-of-State Interests or Substantially 
Burden Interstate Commerce. 
Association des Éleveurs I provided the first national legal attention to 
California’s ban. A lawsuit was filed by the Association des Éleveurs (a group of 
duck and geese farmers from Canada), Hudson Valley Foie Gras (a duck farm and 
 
121. See Jonathan Gold, With Foie Gras Ban, Chefs Say State Is Force-Feeding Morality,  
L.A. TIMES ( June 27, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jun/27/food/la-fo-0628-foie-gras-
20120628 [https://perma.cc/K3SE-Q7BC]. 
122. See GINOR ET AL., supra note 95, at 81. 
123. See Gold, supra note 121; ARTISAN FARMERS ALLIANCE, supra note 120. 
124. See Daniel Guémené et al., Force Feeding: An Examination of Available Scientific Evidence, 
ARTISAN FARMERS ALLIANCE 5 (2006), http://www.artisanfarmers.org/images/Foie_Gras_ 
Study_by_Dr._Guemene.pdf [https://perma.cc/9CZF-4YNS]. 
125. These arguments are summarized by Grant. See Grant, supra note 99, at 88–92. 
126. Id. 
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foie gras purveyor from New York), and Hot’s Restaurant in Hermosa Beach, 
California.127 The dispute has reached finality on the Dormant Commerce claims 
(Association des Éleveurs I), with the U.S. Supreme Court denying a writ of certiorari 
from the Association des Éleveurs, which appealed the Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit upholding the ban.128 In 2014, Nebraska and twelve other states filed 
an amicus curiae brief in the Supreme Court, arguing that California’s ban violated 
the Dormant Commerce Clause.129 The position of these states, along with 
significant agriculture industries, signaled that the food fight was not just over a 
specialty duck product, but instead was about larger issues of state-level regulations 
of farming.130 Recently, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the ban 
on PPIA preemption grounds (Association des Éleveurs II ).131 
On August 30, 2013, in Association des Éleveurs I, the Court of Appeals upheld 
California’s ban with no dissent filed by the panel.132 The court held that Section 
25982 barring foie gras sales in California was not a violation of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause. It reached three important findings, two focused on direct 
impacts on interstate commerce and the third examining indirect impacts.133 First, 
it held that the ban does not discriminate against out-of-state producers. California 
prohibits how an item is made, with force-feeding in this case, but not where the 
item is made. For this analysis, Section 25982 was interpreted as focused on a 
production method. Regarding Dormant Commerce Clause analysis, the court held 
that California regulated a process, used during gavage, and absent this, foie gras 
could still be sold in California. The panel reasoned that the item of foie gras was 
not taken out of the stream of commerce, just that the act of gavage to make the 
item for sale in California was barred. 
Second, the court held that the ban did not directly regulate interstate 
commerce.134 The prohibition is not aimed at out-of-state producers since 
Californian and non-Californian farmers and purveyors are subject to the same 
rules.135 It specifically noted that foie gras is not prohibited, but that the ban barred 
sales of items resulting from force-feedings. Foie gras can still be sold in California 
if it is not produced with force-feeding. Importantly, the court rejected the farmers’ 
 
127. See Ass’n des Éleveurs I, 729 F.3d 937, cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 398 (2014). 
128. See id.. 
129. Thirteen states joined Nebraska in filing an amicus brief in support of Association des 
Éleveurs’ writ of certiorari before the Supreme Court. They included: Alabama, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, 
Missouri, Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, West Virginia, Wyoming. 
Brief of Amici Curiae States of Nebraska, et al. in Support of Petitioners, Ass’n des Éleveurs I, 729 F.3d 
937. 
130. See Khushbu Shah, Thirteen States Petition the Supreme Court to Evaluate the 
Constitutionality of CA’s Foie Ban, EATER ( July 15, 2014, 7:40 AM), http://www.eater.com/2014/7/
15/6186821/thirteen-states-petition-the-supreme-court-to-evaluate-the [https://perma.cc/B3L3-
8AY9]. 
131. Ass’n des Éleveurs II, 870 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 2017), rev’g 79 F. Supp. 3d 1136 (C.D. Cal 2015).   
132. Ass’n des Éleveurs I, 729 F.3d at 937. 
133. Id. at 948, 951. 
134. Id. at 948–49. 
135. Id. at 948. 
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claims that California’s ban violated the Dormant Commerce Clause because of its 
extra-territorial impact.136 The Association des Éleveurs argued that California was 
regulating conduct outside of California. The farmers came from Canada and New 
York and did not want to be excluded from the large California market.137 The court 
distinguished case law finding that regulating conduct outside the boundaries of a 
state is a Dormant Commerce Clause violation. It explained that Healy v. Beer 
Institute and Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig reasoning only apply to extra-territorial price-
fixing.138 In those instances, states’ policies attempted to set prices out of state. Here 
California’s ban on selling foie gras does not attempt to set prices. Lastly, the court 
found no effect of conflicting legislation with California’s ban and other states 
having no such policy.139 Here the concern would be that a producer could not 
comply with California’s requirements and those of another jurisdiction. In this 
instance, these compliance conflicts did not exist for foie gras.140 
Third, the court held that there was not a substantial burden on interstate 
commerce posed by barring sales of force-fed foie gras in California.141 Examining 
these indirect effects, the court engaged in the most substantive commerce analysis 
and balances this with California’s interests in limiting animal cruelty. Here, the test 
used is whether the burden on “interstate commerce is ‘clearly excessive in relation 
to the putative local benefits,’” from Pike v. Bruce Church.142 The court was not 
convinced that the foie gras market was inherently national or required uniform 
regulation. The Association des Éleveurs claimed it would lose over $5 million in 
sales, but the court noted that this number included duck products that could still 
be sold in California that were not produced by force-feeding.143 The economic 
burden the Association des Éleveurs raised was only from the more profitable 
method of force-feeding and not from other methods to make foie gras. 
Comparing these economic burdens to California’s local benefit, the court 
sided with California.144 It noted that California had an interest in preventing animal 
cruelty.145 It cited recent Supreme Court dicta on the history of animal cruelty law 
in the United States. The citation merely referenced a colonial era law, but did not 
refer to any animal cruelty law or farming regulations state or federal.146 Importantly, 
California is pursuing this interest by banning force-feeding and sale inside 
California and importation to California. In sum, the court sided with supporting 
California’s efforts to prevent animal cruelty in food production and not with 
 
136. Id. at 950–51. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. (first citing Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324 (1989); then citing Baldwin v. G.A.F. 
Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935)). 
139. Id. at 951. 
140. Id. at 948. 
141. Id. at 951. 
142. Id. (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137 (1970)). 
143. Id. at 952. 
144. Id. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. (citing United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010)). 
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avoiding commercial burdens for out-of-state purveyors who lose economically 
because of these policies.  
2. The Ban Does Not Interfere with Ingredient Requirements in Federal Poultry 
Inspections 
In Association des Éleveurs II, the duck farmers argued that the PPIA preempted 
California’s ban on selling foie gras. In September of 2017, the Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit disagreed and upheld California’s ban.147 It overturned a 
district court finding from 2015 that the state’s measure was expressly preempted 
by the “ingredient requirement” of the PPIA.148 The court of appeals emphasized 
that this ingredient requirement regarded the physical component of poultry and 
California’s ban on force-feeding did not interfere with this.149 California regulated 
how poultry were treated. The PPIA did something different with its preemption 
that focused on slaughtering, processing, and distribution of poultry products.150 It 
adds that California and other states do regulate poultry as well, refuting arguments 
that federal law displaces the field or that it is impossible to meet California and 
federal requirements.151 
The court in Association des Éleveurs II explicitly discounted how the PPIA 
could interfere with California’s objective to prevent animal cruelty. It noted that 
there is a presumption against preemption especially when the state has a legitimate 
interest. Here, California’s interest in preventing animal cruelty necessitated 
“compelling evidence” of federal intention to displace.152 As explained, the 
ingredient requirement of the PPIA did not reflect this federal intention. The court 
noted that “societal values” and “notions of acceptable food products” change and 
states and countries move accordingly to ban food items.153 The PPIA’s preemption 
is not an obstacle to this.154 
The district court viewed things quite differently. In 2015, the court focused 
on foie gras as a product. It did not see fattened liver as the result of a process. 
Specifically, it found that the PPIA’s ingredient requirements preempt Section 
25982, California’s sales ban.155 This did not affect the ban on force-feeding in 
California. There is a long-term preemption debate involving the PPIA and state-
level policies, regarding poultry eating and processing.156 It noted that the Supreme 
 
147. Ass’n des Éleveurs II, 870 F.3d at 1153. 
148. Id. 
149. Id. at 1147–49. 
150. Id. at 1150. 
151. Id. at 1152–53. 
152. Id. at 1146. 
153. Id. at 1150 n.6. 
154. Id. at 1150. 
155. See Ass’n des Éleveurs de Canards et D’oies du Québec v. Harris, 79 F. Supp. 3d 1136, 
1147 (2015) (referring to the Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA)) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 451–
470)). 
156. For descriptions of preemption in the Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA), see NEIL 
E. HARL, supra note 30, §§ 66.01–66.02. 
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Court, in National Meat Association, found a nearly identical clause in the FMIA 
“swe[pt] broadly.”157 The district court’s preemption finding focused on foie gras 
as an ingredient. California argued that it only regulates a process, which is fattening 
up bird livers.158 The court of appeals agreed with California that only a process was 
banned. 
In sum, of the four food item bans examined in this Article, foie gras presents 
the greatest doctrinal significance since appellate courts have sided with California’s 
animal welfare justifications twice with two distinct constitutional doctrines. For 
Dormant Commerce, California’s interest in preventing animal cruelty, banning foie 
gras sales, outweighs the economic burden suffered by duck farmers. In theory, 
Association des Éleveurs I suggests that if more of an economic impact was felt by 
these farmers, maybe if foie gras were not such a niche product, it would pose a 
Commerce Clause conflict. As is, the farmers and producers cannot overcome the 
Pike balancing test, between California’s interest in animal protection and economic 
burdens.159 Similarly, if the foie gras ban did not apply to Californian farmers and 
sellers but did outside the state, it could be discriminatory and a violation of the 
Commerce Clause. From a preemption perspective, federal statutory inspection 
requirements do not displace California’s ban on foie gras sales. In Association des 
Éleveurs II, the PPIA ingredient requirements are interpreted as focusing on the 
physical components of poultry. This does not encompass a ban on the process of 
gavage. Moreover, the PPIA does not stand in conflict with state interests in 
preventing animal cruelty. 
C. Shark Fin: Banning Possession and Sale Is Legal, 
Evading Inquiry into Federal Conservation Policies 
California’s efforts to end eating shark fins points to a third constitutional 
debate between state and federal authority over food and animal protection.160 Even 
though here, so far, courts have sided with the state’s animal welfare interests, these 
disputes reflect many of the legal arguments arising in foie gras, egg, and downer 
cases.161 Dormant Commerce Clause and preemption doctrines shape how conflicts 
between food choices and animal welfare were resolved. For shark fin regulations, 
California has been successful in having courts side with its conservation and 
anticruelty objectives. Courts have found no economic discrimination in a ban on 
selling or possessing shark fins, with Californians and state businesses subject to the 
 
157. See Ass’n des Éleveurs, 79 F. Supp. 3d at 1144 (citing Nat’l Meat Ass’n, 132 S. Ct. at 970). 
158. Id. at 1144–45. 
159. See supra note 142. 
160. For legal analysis of shark fin bans, see Carrie A. Laliberte, Comment, Cutting the Fins  
Off of Federal Shark Laws: A Cooperative Federalism Approach to Shark Finning Legislation, 46  
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 979, 996–1001 (2014) (arguing against federal regulation and for increased state- 
level regulation); Elizabeth Neville, Note, Shark Finning: A Ban to Change the Tide of Extinction, 25 
COLO. NAT. RESOURCES ENERGY & ENVTL. L. REV. 387 (2014) (describing state, federal, and 
international legal regulation of shark finning). 
161. See Chinatown Neighborhood Ass’n, 794 F.3d at 1140–41. 
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same rules as those out of state.162 Also, courts have found the ban not in conflict 
with federal efforts to conserve sharks with permitted shark fishing. The shark fin 
ban illustrates how similar political goals, in federal and state policies, facilitate the 
courts’ legal approval. 
Federal and state policies attempting to end, with criminal prosecution or 
fines, the eating, finning (cutting a shark’s fin and discarding the animal carcass 
after), or trade in shark fins have been implemented since 1995.163 Each subsequent 
measure increases the severity of fines or tries to further regulate activities while at 
sea, in the water, arriving on shore, and seeking a sale. These measures have the 
explicit objective of trying to stop fishing, selling, and eating shark fins outside 
California and in consumption markets outside the United States.164 This Section 
describes shark fin consumption, policies aimed at ending this, and then 
constitutional law in debates raised in Chinatown Neighborhood Association v. Harris, 
specific to California’s Shark Fin Law passed in 2011.165 At first federal law banned 
the process of removing fins from sharks. Then California added to this by 
prohibiting the possession or sale of these fins, whether the fish was legally caught 
or not.166 In terms of California law, the item of shark fin is illegal to possess or 
sell.167 
Shark fin soup has been eaten for centuries, as a celebratory dish served mostly 
at weddings and banquets, as a traditional luxurious item in Southern Chinese 
cuisine.168 Its recent controversy develops from concerns for shark conservation, 
finning’s cruelty, and increased consumption by a rising class of moneyed eaters in 
China and other parts of Asia.169 The dish’s history dates back to the Ming Dynasty 
 
162. Id. at 1145–47. 
163. In 1995, California made it illegal to sell, deliver for commercial purposes, or possess any 
“shark fin or shark tail or portion” that had been “removed from the carcass.” See id. at 1140 (citing 
CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 7704(c) (2016)). In 2000, Congress added finning bars to the Manguson-
Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSA), making it unlawful to remove the fins at 
sea, possess detached fins on a fishing vessel, transfer them to another vessel, and bring them onshore. 
See id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1857(1)(P) (2012)). 
164. See Shelly Clarke et al., Social, Economic, and Regulatory Drivers of the Shark Fin Trade,  
22 MARINE RESOURCE ECON. 305, 316, 320 (2007); Hampus Eriksson & Shelley Clarke, Chinese 
Market Responses to Overexploitations of Sharks and Sea Cucumbers, 184 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 
163, 170–71 (2015); Bonnie Tsui, Opinion, Souring on Shark Fin Soup, N.Y. TIMES: SUNDAY  
REVIEW ( June 29, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/30/opinion/sunday/souring- 
on-shark-fin-soup.html?_r=0 [https://web.archive.org/web/20170203162037/http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2013/06/30/opinion/sunday/souring-on-shark-fin-soup.html?_r=0] (describing 
how increases in moneyed classes and business cultures in Asia fuel shark fin demand and how 
consumption may decrease with changes in foodway culture and bans on finning and fin possession). 
165. See Chinatown Neighborhood Ass’n, 794 F.3d at 1145–47. 
166. See id. at 1140. 
167. See CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 7704(c) (West 2013 & Supp. 2016). 
168. See generally Michael Fabinyi, Historical, Cultural and Social Perspectives on Luxury Seafood 
Consumption in China, 39 ENVTL. CONSERVATION 83 (2012); Gordon C.K. Cheung & Chak Yan 
Chang, Cultural Identities of Chinese Business: Networks of the Shark-Fin Business in Hong Kong, 17 ASIA 
PACIFIC BUS. REV. 343 (2011). 
169. See generally Clarke et al., supra note 164; Fabinyi, supra note 168, at 87; Tsui, supra note 164. 
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(AD 1368–1644), when it was served in royal ceremonies as something expensive 
and exotic, since sharks were difficult to catch.170 Shark fin, primarily because of its 
gelatinous fibers and not the actual skin or flesh, has been appreciated as something 
exclusive, reflecting high social status, and providing physical strength as a sort of 
tonic.171 This appeal and uniqueness is why it is served at weddings and banquets, 
reflecting the host’s generosity and affluence. Such elaborate meals are designed to 
create lasting memories for family of a wedding party or invited business 
relations.172 From this continuing history, shark fin is deeply reflective of a long-
held food culture of celebration and toasting to good fortune. With recent gains in 
spending power throughout China and Asia, shark fin has become an increasingly 
popular delicacy in the past few decades.173 
When California’s ban was discussed in the legislature and media, it was 
described as racist, targeting Chinese cuisine and culture. Patricia Leigh Brown 
described these sentiments as seeing the ban as “a sort of Chinese Exclusion Act in 
a bowl,” referring to the explicit and extensive cultural, political, and legal measures 
from the late nineteenth and early twentieth century United States.174 The ban can 
easily be viewed as merely extending nativist tropes in the United States about food 
with regard to Asians and Asian Americans. In this light, shark fin soup appears as 
the cruel and undesirable food of a foreign culture, unwilling to accept 
environmental and moral reasons to ban its use. Robert Ji-Song Ku, Martin 
Manalansan, and Anita Mannur argue that for Asian Americans, food is a perpetual 
reminder of inequalities.175 They argue that “most matters related to food” are 
loaded with racial meanings and racialization.176 For them, Asian foodways are an 
important part of a “‘trope’ of the smelly and unwashed immigrant.”177 These tropes 
stand out when Asian cuisine is painted as exotic, unclean, or cruel to the American 
public. 
As California proposed more stringent bans on shark fin than federal law, 
various community leaders and groups pointed to the bill as racist. Leland Yee, then 
a California State Senator and mayoral candidate in San Francisco, described the 
 
170. See Clarke et al., supra note 164, at 307. 
171. See Fabinyi, supra note 168, at 87; Clarke et al., supra note 164, at 307; Eriksson & Clarke, 
supra note 164, at 168. 
172. See Fabinyi, supra note 168, at 88. 
173. See id. at 87. 
174. Patricia Leigh Brown, Soup Without Fins? Some Californians Simmer, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/06/us/06fin.html?_r=0 [https://web.archive.org/web/ 
20170122171250/http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/06/us/06fin.html?_r=0]. 
175. See Robert Ji-Song Ku et al., An Alimentary Introduction, in EATING ASIAN AMERICA: A 
FOOD STUDIES READER 1, 1 (Robert Ji-Song Ku et al. eds., 2013). 
176. Id. Looking to Asian American identity and food, this adapts Michael Omi and Howard 
Winant’s focus on racial formation. Omi and Winant define racial formation as “the sociohistorical 
process by which racial categories are created, inhabited, transformed, and destroyed.” MICHAEL OMI 
& HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES 55 (2d ed. 1994). 
177. See Robert Ji-Song Ku et al., supra note 175, at 3. 
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ban as an “attack on Asian culture.”178 He emphasized that the ban targeted shark 
fins even if removed from a whole fish caught legally. Federal law banned finning 
and leaving the carcass aside. But California aimed to ban any possession or removal 
of shark fins, even if the shark was legally caught. Part of California’s objective was 
to stop the trade of fins brought from overseas to California,179 to be served to 
eaters in California or on route to buyers in Asia. California wanted to stop both 
the trade in the item and serving the item in the state. The tradition of serving the 
soup at banquets, something admired and celebrated for centuries would be 
especially felt by older eaters, who did not agree with recent moral and 
environmental sentiments. Chef Jonathan Wu supported the ban, but noted that 
conservation justifications have not been extended to Caspian Sturgeon or Bluefin 
Tuna, which are also endangered but are far more popular in the United States.180 
The question becomes whether sharks are singled out to be saved by the ban or 
whether Chinese culture targeted as the subject of the ban. 
Some voices from Asian, Asian American, and eater audiences supported the 
ban, siding with the conservation justifications. Chef Charlie Phan emphasized the 
challenges faced by eating sustainably caught seafood, despite its cultural history and 
significance.181 The bill’s sponsor, Chinese-American Assemblyman Paul Fong, 
pointed to the science of endangered sharks and the cruelty of consumption.182 He 
added that shark fin is not a “staple in the Chinese diet” and its consumption 
pointed more to wealth and privilege than eating on a regular basis.183 Noting similar 
bans had been passed in Hawai’i and the Northern Mariana Islands, he described 
Chinese culture as not so “fragile that it would fall apart with one little delicacy that 
only . . . wealthy people can afford to eat.”184  
Aside from cultural and cruelty concerns, shark conservation motivates efforts 
to ban shark fin production. Many shark species have suffered from shrinking in 
populations from ninety to ninety-nine percent in recent decades.185 In 2011, 10.3 
 
178. See Jonathan Kauffman, Is Banning Shark’s Fin Racist?, SFWEEKLY: SFOODIE (Feb. 15, 
2011, 6:04 PM), http://www.sfweekly.com/foodie/2011/02/15/is-banning-sharks-fin-racist [https:// 
perma.cc/78JP-QLMQ]. 
179. See Maureen Cavanaugh et al., Legislation to Ban Sale, Possession of Shark Fins in California, 
KPBS (Feb. 22, 2011), http://www.kpbs.org/news/2011/feb/22/legislation-ban-shark-finning-
california/ [https://perma.cc/PQ2E-LJX9]. 
180. See Francis Lam, Is It Racist to Ban Shark’s Fin Soup?, SALON (Mar. 7, 2011, 7:01 AM), 
http://www.salon.com/2011/03/07/sharks_fin_soup_ban/ [https://perma.cc/VN8K-P3VW]. 
181. See Brown, supra note 174. 
182. See Dana Goodyear, No Sharks Were Harmed in the Making of This Shark Fin Soup, THE 
NEW YORKER (Dec. 28, 2011), http://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/no-sharks-were-
harmed-in-the-making-of-this-shark-fin-soup [https://perma.cc/23Q6-GF2M]. 
183. Cavanaugh et al., supra note 179. 
184. Id. 
185. See John R. Platt, Hong Kong Imported 10 Million Kilograms of Shark Fins Last Year,  
SCI. AM.: EXTINCTION COUNTDOWN ( July 18, 2012), http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/
extinction-countdown/hong-kong-imported-10-million-kilograms-shark-fins/ [https://perma.cc/ 
KDB8-FMNY]. 
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million kilograms of shark-fin products were imported into Hong Kong.186 Sharks 
are caught all over the world, with the high price of shark fin creating the incentive 
to catch them on the open seas.187 Fins can be worth up to $181 per pound.188 This 
can be 20 to 250 times the price for shark meat. Fishermen catch the fish in waters 
near South America, Europe, Africa, Asia, or the Middle East, and then transport 
the fin to Hong Kong or Guangdong, China, often by plane through California.189 
This high price creates an incentive for fishermen to catch the sharks while out to 
sea. Without such a high price for shark fins, fishermen would prioritize other fish 
or boat space for something other than a shark fin or shark carcass. Space and 
weight limitations deeply influence what fishermen catch, keep, throw overboard, 
and/or bring to shore.190 If boats have to carry the shark carcass while out to sea, 
their catch is worth far less, since the entire fish occupies limited space and weight 
capacities on the boat. Often sharks are by-catch, retrieved when looking for more 
lucrative tuna or other fish.191 In economic terms, it suits fishing boats to catch 
sharks, discard the carcass and only take the fins on their long journeys. This results 
in throwing away in the ocean the rest of the shark’s body. The high price of shark 
fins fuels this motivation, with shark meat and other parts providing far less profit. 
To justify California’s law and other measures, California and conservationists 
present the global shark population as severely threatened by extinction. A major 
concern is that sharks are top-level predators in the ocean and if their populations 
are depleted then marine ecosystems will suffer greatly. The Shark Savers reports 
that: one third of all shark species are threatened with extinction; eighty percent of 
open-ocean shark species targeted in high sea fisheries are threatened or near 
threatened with extinction; and all of the shark species most prevalent in the shark 
fin trade are threatened or near threatened with extinction.192 Sharks are particularly 
vulnerable to extinction since they do not reproduce frequently, mature slowly, and 
 
186. See id. 
187. The Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations lists twenty-six countries 
as the top shark-finning countries, where eighty-four percent of the shark finning takes place. These 
include: Indonesia, India, Spain, Taiwan Province of China, Argentina, Mexico, the United States, 
Pakistan, Malaysia, Japan, France, Thailand, Brazil, Sri Lanka, New Zealand, Portugal, Nigeria, Iran, the 
United Kingdom, the Republic of Korea, Canada, Peru, Australia, Yemen, Senegal, and Venezuela. See 
JOHANNE FISCHER ET AL., FAO, REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL PLAN 
OF ACTION FOR THE CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT OF SHARKS iv, 63 (2012), http://
www.fao.org/docrep/017/i3036e/i3036e.pdf [https://perma.cc/8J9K-CVVE]. 
188. See Sharks! Attacked, SHARK SAVERS, http://www.sharksavers.org/files/7913/4211/
4391/usInfographic.pdf [https://web.archive.org/web/20170111011854/http://www.sharksavers.org/ 
files/7913/4211/4391/usInfographic.pdf ]  (last visited July 5, 2016). 
189. See FISCHER ET AL., supra note 187, at 63. 
190. See Clarke et al., supra note 164, at 316. 
191. Id. 
192. See Shark Fin Soup Destroys Shark Populations, SHARK SAVERS, http://www.sharksavers.org/
en/our-programs/i-m-finished-with-fins/learn-more/shark-fin-soup-destroys-shark-
populations/[https://web.archive.org/web/20170122172256/http://www.sharksavers.org/en/ou
r-programs/i-m-finished-with-fins/learn-more/shark-fin-soup-destroys-shark-populations/] (last 
visited July 5, 2016). 
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have few pups when they do give birth.193 Other fish species populations can more 
easily recover from depletion. National regulations of shark fins are among the most 
common tools to manage shark populations.194 Other measures include by-catch 
and discard requirements, protecting species, allotting allowable catches, quotas, 
and reporting.195 
The group WildAid has been one of the leaders of international campaigns to 
raise awareness so potential eaters move away from buying, serving, or eating shark 
fins. The campaign has included television and video board ads with celebrities like 
basketball player Yao Ming, soccer star David Beckham and actors Jian Wen and 
Maggie Q urging the public in China and Southeast Asia not to eat shark fins. In 
2012, the Chinese government reported that it stopped serving shark fin at state 
banquets, as part of an effort to limit lavish public spending and encourage similar 
efforts amongst citizens.196 These awareness campaigns along with bans on finning 
and on shark fin sales tackle the demand and supply sides of the trade. It has been 
predicted that without regulation or changes in consumer attitudes shark fins would 
continue to be sourced on the open seas.197 
These campaigns have had results. Shark fin production has declined because 
of limits of the supply, changes in consumer preferences, and/or regulations on the 
trade. As of 2015, these reductions have been reported as: by approximately twenty 
percent since 2003,198 and seventy percent reduction or elimination of eating shark 
fin soup by Hong Kong residents, and eighty-one percent of these cite 
environmental justifications.199 In 2014, for Mainland China reported reductions 
include drops in shark trade by eighty-two percent in Guangzho, the center of the 
shark fin trade,200 and significant declines by surveyed Beijing banquet 
restaurants.201 
Policies trying to stop shark fin consumption have a long history. Efforts in 
California and federal law seeking to end eating shark fins predate California’s 2011 
law.202 In 1995, the state passed a law focusing on activities on the water, i.e. shark 
 
193. Id. 
194. See FISCHER ET AL., supra note 187, at iv. 
195. See id. 
196. Bettina Wassener, China Says No More Shark Fin Soup at State Banquets, N.Y. TIMES 
( July 3, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/04/world/asia/china-says-no-more-shark- 
fin-soup-at-state-banquets.html [https://web.archive.org/web/20170122172328/http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2012/07/04/world/asia/china-says-no-more-shark-fin-soup-at-state-banquets.html]. 
197. See Clarke et al., supra note 164, at 320. 
198. See Eriksson & Clarke, supra note 164, at 163–73. 
199. See Imogen Zethoven, Hong Kong Says No to Shark Fin Soup, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS 
(May 7, 2015), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/analysis/2015/05/07/hong-
kong-says-no-to-shark-fin-soup [https://perma.cc/WFZ3-2WRY]. 
200. See Jennifer Duggan, Sales of Shark Fin in China Drop by Up to 70%, THE GUARDIAN 
(Aug. 7, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/chinas-choice/2014/aug/08/sales-of-
shark-fin-china-drop-70 [https://perma.cc/KN3W-M52Q]. 
201. See Michael Fabinyi & Neng Liu, Seafood Banquets in Beijing: Consumer Perspectives and 
Implications for Environmental Sustainability, 12 CONSERVATION & SOC’Y 218 (2014). 
202. See Chinatown Neighborhood Ass’n, 794 F.3d at 1140. 
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finning. It made it “unlawful to sell, purchase, deliver for a commercial purpose, or 
possess on a commercial fishing vessel . . . a shark fin or tail or part of a shark fin 
or tail that has been removed from the carcass.”203 This made it illegal for fishermen 
to use the fin, tail, or part of the shark. This did not make it entirely illegal to fish a 
shark and then use its fin. Conceivably, a shark could be caught as permitted and 
from this the fin then removed. The 1995 ban only made it illegal to remove the fin 
and leave the carcass. Likewise, the ban was limited to catching the fish or actions 
on the water or with the carcass. This did not regulate commercial activity on land. 
It could be argued that merchants on land who possessed shark fins could avoid 
these 1995 measures. 
Inspired by similar objectives, federal law passed similar measures in 2000. 
Congress prohibited shark finning. It amended the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery 
Conservation and Management Act (MSA) by making it unlawful to remove fins 
from sharks at sea, possess detached fins aboard a boat, move fins from one boat 
to another, and to land the fin onshore.204 These federal policies contained 
loopholes to the finning ban, involving total weight and vessel types.205 
California has prevailed in legal disputes over how its shark fin law violates 
the Dormant Commerce Clause and is preempted by federal fish conservation 
statutes. The 2011 law was challenged by the Chinatown Neighborhood 
Association, and reached a decision by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
in September 2015.206 Similar to foie gras, the court found that banning possession 
and sales of shark fins did not violate the Dormant Commerce Clause.207 It 
reasoned that the ban did not favor Californian interests and did not discriminate 
against out-of-state interests.208 Both out-of-state sellers and buyers and California 
sellers and buyers were subject to the prohibition. The court also discounted any 
finding that ban had any illegal effect outside California and was an “extraterritorial” 
violation.209 It explained that “extraterritorial” effects violate the Dormant 
Commerce Clause only when states attempt to fix prices in other states. 210 Here, 
California merely bans this food item inside and outside the state, with no California 
effort to set or change prices outside the state. 
 
203. See CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 7704(c) (West 2013 & Supp. 2016). 
204. See 16 U.S.C. § 1857(1)(P) (2012); Shark Conservation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-348, 
§ 103(a)(1), 124 Stat. 3668, 3670 (2011); Shark Finning Prohibition Act, Pub. L. No. 106-557, § 3, 114 
Stat. 2772 (2000). 
205. The finning prohibition did not apply to situations when the total weight of the shark fins 
was less than five percent of the total weight of the shark carcasses on the boat. See NAT’L MARINE 
FISHERIES SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 2011 SHARK FINNING REPORT TO CONGRESS 2 (2011), 
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/ia/species/sharks/2011_shark_finning_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
48CP-4FRY]. Before changes by the Obama administration in 2008, the finning ban only applied to a 
“fishing vessel” and fins could not be seized on other kinds of boats such as a chartered vessel. United 
States v. Approximately 64,796 Pounds of Shark Fins, 520 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2008). 
206. See Chinatown Neighborhood Ass’n, 794 F.3d at 1136. 
207. See id. 
208. See id. at 1146–47. 
209. See id. at 1146. 
210. See id. 
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In terms of burden placed on commerce by the ban, the court found that the 
benefit of the ban outweighed the commercial burden for the sellers and buyers, 
which is presented as insignificant.211 Specifically, the benefit of the ban included 
shark conservation, preventing cruelty, and protecting wildlife and health.212 For the 
Pike test, California’s choices as a state were seen as more significant than the 
economic effects of the ban. The court went so far as to indicate that shark fin 
regulation is not inherently national and, as such, California efforts do not step over 
or conflict with federal authority.213 
This court was heavily influenced by state choices regarding eating animals, 
specifically to conserve shark and stop their cruel killing. Fishermen and shark fin 
eaters do not benefit from legal protections often extended to farmers’ livestock. 
The court neatly deferred to California choices about ending this practice for moral 
reasons and for conservation justifications. 
Potential conflicts between California’s ban and federal fish conservation 
goals point to important preemption inquiries.214 This did not ultimately convince 
the court to strike the law or to even permit the Chinatown Neighborhood 
Association to amend its complaint to include preemption claims. So, for now, 
Justice Reinhardt’s dissenting opinion and briefs filed by the federal government 
suggest how animal conservation policies and shark fin bans may conceivably 
conflict.215 The MSA contains specific objectives of how to conserve shark 
populations by allowing them to be legally caught.216 Many shark species are 
overpopulated and threaten the ecosystem. California’s ban prohibits this legal 
fishing, determined by the federal government as needed for conservation reasons. 
The federal MSA does not have an express preemption provision.217 This 
poses a different inquiry than developed for foie gras or slaughters. Questions about 
if this federal statute displaced the California ban had to examine if there was 
conflict between complying with both federal and state law. The MSA was enacted 
to create a federal-regional partnership to manage fisheries. With it, the federal 
government has “sovereign rights and exclusive fishery management over all fish, 
 
211. See id. at 1147. 
212. See id. 
213. Id. 
214. For discussion of preemption, the MSA, and state regulations, see Fisheries Ass’n,  
Inc. v. Chiles, 979 F.2d 1504 (11th Cir. 1992); Se. Fisheries Ass’n, Inc. v. Mosbacher, 773 F. Supp. 435 
(D.D.C. 1991); and Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Preemption of State and Local Regulations by Magnuson 
Fishery Conservation and Management Act (16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801 to 1883), 31 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 337 
(2008). 
215. See Chinatown Neighborhood Ass’n, 794 F.3d at 1149 (Reinhardt, S. dissenting). In an appeal 
of a denial of Chinatown Neighborhood Association’s motion for preliminary injunction, the 
Department of Justice submitted papers arguing that California’s shark fin ban conflicted with the 
MSA. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants and Reversal 
on the Supremacy Clause Claim, Chinatown Neighborhood Ass’n v Brown, 539 F. App’x 761 (9th  
Cir. 2013) (No. 13-15188), 2013 WL 3914118, at *17. 
216. Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSA) § 304, 16 U.S.C. §§ 
1801–1891 (2012). 
217. See Chinatown Neighborhood Ass’n, 794 F.3d at 1141 (finding “conflict preemption”). 
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all Continental Shelf fishery resources, within the exclusive economic zone 
(“EEZ”),” extending 200 miles off the shore.218 The court found that the 
Chinatown Neighborhood Association did not identify any actual conflict between 
the MSA and the California shark fin law.219 Fishermen can comply with California’s 
ban and federal legal shark fishing to use sharks for oil, meat, and skin. The court 
adds that because both state-level and federal authorities implement the MSA, there 
is more cooperation than conflict between these two regimes. 
Judge Reinhardt’s dissenting opinion suggests that the court should more 
closely examine conflict between the federal requirements of the EEZ and 
California’s ban and grant the Chinatown Neighborhood Association request to 
amend its complaint.220 The Association had argued two points. First was that the 
EEZ contains specific quotas for shark fishing to optimize the MSA’s yield.221 
Second, it averred that California’s ban created an obstacle to achieving these quotas 
because it significantly decreased legal shark fishing.222 Said simply, the federal 
government creates a quota system to specify the amount of a particular species that 
should be caught and California’s ban interferes with this. It was argued that an 
amended complaint could show how the number of sharks caught in the EEZ had 
fallen dramatically. 
In sum, California’s ban on possessing or selling shark fins offers the best 
example of legal support of animal welfare, since the state’s efforts are consistent 
with and add to federal and international efforts to stop the eating of shark fins. 
Sharks are an endangered animal, a fact supporting the state-level ban. With 
antifinning measures in effect for over twenty years, it is not a surprise to fisherman 
and merchants that shark fins are regulated. California’s latest ban reflects a long-
term trend, different than legal resistance faced by initial implementation of bans 
on downer slaughter, foie gras sales, and battery-cage eggs. This context makes it 
easier for a court to discard any economic discrimination, favoring California, posed 
by the ban. An additional Dormant Commerce Clause analysis not yet examined by 
courts regards how California’s ban impacts overseas shipments of shark fins. The 
recent ban effectively makes it illegal for air shipments of shark fin entering or 
leaving the state. Cargo planes carry this food item from all over the world and stop 
to make transfers at airports in Los Angeles or San Francisco. One day a court may 
review how this established pathway for shark fins inbound from Western 
Hemisphere, European, or African waters and outbound for Asian eater markets. 
Similarly, arguments in support of overturning the ban illuminate a great deal 
about how animal welfare fits into legal debates about food equity. Concerns for 
where conservation is directed casts doubt on how fair the prohibition is. Sharks 
are an endangered animal, but by no means are they the only seafood whose over 
 
218. See id. at 1139. 
219. See id. at 1142. 
220. See id. at 1148. 
221. See id. at 1149. 
222. See id. 
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fishing threatens species’ extinction. Many shark fin advocates see this ban as racist, 
reflecting historic American notions of Asians as foreign and their eating habits as 
undesired. For them, singling out this food item steeped in Chinese culture is 
discriminatory. Moreover, federal law attempts to conserve shark populations by 
permitting specific levels of fishing in the EEZ. Here California’s ban makes it 
impossible to comply with both federal EEZ permissions and state law. Unlike meat 
and poultry inspection statutes, the MSA does not contain a preemption clause. 
Accordingly, it is not so clearly laid out that federal conservation goals conflict with 
California’s conservation and humanitarian concerns. The lesson is that the cultural 
assumptions and conservation goals of shark fin bans are not clean cut. 
D. Eggs: Farming and Animal Groups Agree, Forcing States 
to Unsuccessfully Fight for Interstate Commerce 
The fourth controversy between California’s animal protection efforts and the 
Constitution involves the ban on battery-cage housing for egg-laying hens. In 2008, 
California voters approved Proposition 2, the Prevention of Farm Cruelty Act, by a 
large margin with sixty-three percent of favorable votes.223 The Act outlaws various 
housing methods for farm animals including battery cages for egg-laying hens.224 It 
generally sought that animals be provided space to move and extend their limbs 
while raised on farms. Proposition 2 was a significant step in applying animal 
welfare standards to farms in California, with the battery-cage ban creating the 
greatest legal controversy. Two years later, the state passed AB 1437, prohibiting 
the sale of any out-of-state eggs in California that do not comply with the 
Proposition 2 housing requirements.225 Immediately, this was argued to unfairly 
protect California’s egg farmers and close off the national egg market to the state. 
From these two efforts, one approved directly by voters and one from the 
legislature, the California Egg Case ensued, when Missouri initiated the lawsuit on 
February 3, 2014.226 In this suit, Missouri and five other egg-producing states argued 
that California’s ban on battery cages violated the Dormant Commerce Clause and 
Supremacy Clause. 
California’s regulation focused on animal housing methods, in this case it was 
hens in battery cages. A district court and the court of appeals have only ruled on a 
procedural matter of the lawsuit, finding Missouri lacked standing.227 In essence, 
these courts argued that no economic injury is felt by the states that raise these 
claims. These courts have asked for the state to point to any economic injury from 
 
223. DEBRA BOWEN, STATEMENT OF VOTE: NOVEMBER 4, 2008, GENERAL ELECTION 7 
(2008), http://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/sov/2008-general/sov_complete.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
CY5Y-HKY9]. 
224. Id. 
225. See AB-1437, 2009–2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. 
226. See Jim Miller, Judge Rejects Suit Against Egg Law by 6 Other States, SAC. BEE, Oct. 3, 
2014, at 4A. 
227. Missouri ex rel. Koster, 847 F.3d at 652; Missouri, 58 F. Supp. 3d at 1079. 
Final to Printer_Hernandez-Lopez (Do Not Delete) 12/13/2017  3:08 PM 
380 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:347 
battery-cage prohibitions or for a private actor to bring these claims.228 The 
Supreme Court has denied review of this case.229 
Interestingly, with hen eggs, private actors have incrementally and increasingly 
supported the requirements in Proposition 2 and AB 1437.230 Since California 
passed these two policies, egg producers and animal welfare advocates have worked 
together to support these bans, with each group withdrawing their support for 
additional state-level polices or additional lawsuits. Moreover, responding to 
consumer demand and regulations from California and other states, large chain 
restaurants and grocers have announced they will not sell, serve, or produce eggs 
from hens housed in battery cages.231 These trends point to animal welfare norms 
developing outside the political and litigation arenas. This Section proceeds by 
describing the political efforts and technology behind Proposition 2, cooperation 
between the United Egg Producers (UEP) and HSUS and its legal impacts, the 
significance of the California Egg Case so far, and market support for animal welfare 
measures outside the courts and legislatures. 
In general terms, hens for egg production can be housed in three manners: 
battery cages, enriched cages, and free range.232 Battery cages house hens in small 
wire or metal enclosures indoors, usually providing about sixty-seven square inches 
per bird.233 The argued advantage of cages is that they provide automated feeding 
and watering and separate hens from each other and their waste. Such spatial 
limitations offer the capacity to raise a larger amount of hens and produce eggs. 
Ninety-five percent of egg farmers in the United States use these cages.234 California 
has banned battery-cage housing in the state and prohibited the sale of any eggs 
from hens housed this way. 
The two other housing systems emphasize greater hen mobility, allowing them 
to stretch their limbs, move, and as such are argued to be less cruel than battery 
cages. Enriched cages separate the hens from each other and from their feeding and 
waste. Generally, these systems are a hybrid between automation of indoor housing 
 
228. See Missouri ex rel. Koster, 847 F.3d at 652–54; Missouri, 58 F. Supp. 3d at 1072. 
229. See Missouri v. Becerra, 137 S. Ct. 2188 (2017). 
230. Burger King, McDonalds, Walmart, Aramark, Sodexho, Trader Joes, Starbucks, Panera, 
Subway, Taco Bell and many others have announced places to stop using eggs from batter cages. For a 
description of recent food industry announcements, see Jimmy Sherfey, What the Fast-Food Industry 
Shift to Cage-Free Eggs Really Means, EATER (Feb. 17, 2016), http://www.eater.com/2016/2/17/
11009252/what-are-cage-free-eggs [https://perma.cc/3XAH-56U4]; Gregory Barber, Are Cage-Free 
Eggs All They’re Cracked Up to Be?, MOTHER JONES (Feb. 16, 2016), http://www.motherjones.com/
blue-marble/2016/02/corporations-are-going-cage-free-whats-next-hens [https://perma.cc/J2MH-
69M6]; Jennifer Chaussee, The Insanely Complicated Logistics for Cage-Fee Eggs for All, WIRED  
( Jan. 25, 2016), http://www.wired.com/2016/01/the-insanely-complicated-logistics-of-cage-free-
eggs-for-all/ [https://perma.cc/AJU8-5HVM]. 
231. Jimmy Sherfey, supra note 230. 
232. This summarizes descriptions in JOEL L. GREENE & TADLOCK COWAN,  
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42534, TABLE EGG PRODUCTION AND HEN WELFARE: AGREEMENT 
AND LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS 7 (2014). 
233. See id. 
234. See id. 
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and hens roaming freely outdoors. They include classifications such as aviary, 
modified, colony, and furnished cages. The last system is free range, which allows 
the hens to have outdoor access. This is argued by many to be the least cruel and 
most natural for the hens, since the animal has the most movement and behavior 
options.235 From a contrasting view point, free-range housing is criticized as 
exposing the hens to predators, limiting sanitary controls, and allowing hens to 
attack each other, which is their natural behavior. 
In 2011, the traditionally opposing groups of the UEP and HSUS announced 
an agreement significantly impacting what legal measures would be pursued to 
further welfare for egg-laying hens.236 The UEP represents that largest national 
organization of farmers who raise hens for eggs while the HSUS is the most 
influential animal advocacy organization, leading political, education, and litigation 
campaigns on a variety of animal welfare measures. Importantly, they have focused 
on animals in agriculture. Both sides decided that it was too expensive to continue 
seeking state-voter initiatives like Proposition 2 or to challenge or defend them in 
court.237 Accordingly, their 2011 agreement included various provisions for a set 
period of time, but the most important were to not challenge existing state battery-
cage bans, not pursue additional state initiatives to prohibit battery cages, and work 
towards and support federal hen-egg housing standards.238 The immediate results 
of this agreement were threefold: no UEP farm would challenge California’s 
measures; these specific measures were left as the last state-level battery-cage bans 
for the time being, and it signaled that animal advocates and agriculture were open 
to working together to change how animals were treated on farms, avoiding 
expensive litigation and lobbying of state-level measures.239 For farmers it also 
allowed them to control how they would give in to hen-housing reform. They could 
avoid spending resources on policy lobbying and legal action. 
On October 2, 2014, a district court dismissed the lawsuit brought by Missouri 
against California, alleging Commerce Clause and preemption violations from 
requirements that all eggs sold in California comply with animal care standards in 
Proposition 2. The court granted California’s motion to dismiss because Missouri 
lacked standing.240 On November 17, 2016, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling that Missouri lacked standing.241 The 
court of appeals only reversed the district court’s dismissal of Missouri’s complaint 
with prejudice. It explained that Missouri could allege “post-effective-date facts,” 
since AB 1437’s went into effect, that would support standing.242 Essentially, the 
court heavily doubted Missouri was the proper party to bring this lawsuit, but it left 
 
235. See id at 21. 
236. See id. at 9–10. 
237. See id. at 10. 
238. See id. at 9–10. 
239. See id. 
240. Missouri, 58 F. Supp. 3d at 1079. 
241. Missouri ex rel. Koster, 847 F.3d at 656. 
242. Id. 
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the door open for facts, since the law became effective in 2014, to be raised in a 
complaint. 
The dismissal of Missouri’s complaint illustrates the complexities of how 
animal welfare norms can develop adjacent to the political and legal arenas. Missouri 
argued that it had parens patriae standing, representing a “quasi-sovereign 
interest.”243 The state argued that its interest was to protect its citizens’ economic 
health and constitutional rights as well as its own status in the federal system. AB 
1437’s purpose was not to improve how hens were treated, but to protect 
California’s own egg farms. Missouri averred that closing off sales of battery-cage 
eggs, which are the most popular nationwide, was inconsistent with federalist 
principles. This made non-Californian egg farmers decide to forgo the California 
market, the largest in the nation, or to substantially increase their production costs. 
These decisions would result in major investments and losses for farmers relying on 
a national market in eggs, free from protectionist state measures. Furthermore, 
Missouri argued that battery cages were better for hens and that AB 1437 was 
enacted as a pretext to protect California’s egg producers, but in reality it had limited 
public-health justifications.244 
In its appeal, Missouri offered more complex arguments to distinguish the 
harm the state suffered versus the interests of private parties in the lawsuit. They 
were the following: harm to egg farmers in the state, harmful price fluctuations for 
eggs prices, and discrimination for non-Californian eggs.245 The court rejected these 
and argued that egg farmers could seek their own court action;246 changes in prices 
were too speculative, only felt by farmers and not consumers, and this commodity 
was not of “central economic significance;”247 and that California’s measure did not 
discriminate since the battery-cage policy impacted both in-state and out-of-state 
eggs.248 
Both courts argued that any potential economic injury from California’s 
measure would be to the farmers and not Missouri or its residents. The cited harms 
and burdens only belong to those farmers who want to sell to California and not 
the residents of Missouri.249 For this reason, the state did not have standing in court. 
Missouri brought the suit since egg famers (at least a large percentage of them) 
had decided to cooperate with battery-cage requirements and not challenge 
California and/or opted for not selling eggs in California.250 The UEP and HSUS 
agreement from 2011 signaled this shift. Contrary to the position of other farming 
groups, the UEP decided it was better to work to implement these animal cruelty 
policies. Farming associations historically oppose any animal cruelty measures in 
 
243. Missouri, 58 F. Supp. 3d at 1068. 
244. Id. at 1065. 
245. Missouri ex rel. Koster, 847 F.3d at 652–55. 
246. Id. at 652. 
247. Id. at 654–55. 
248. Id. at 655. 
249. Missouri, 58 F. Supp. 3d at 1078. 
250. See Sherfey, supra note 230; Greene & Cowan, supra note 232, at 9–10. 
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food production. They typically regard the HSUS and other animal advocates as 
their opposition. The National Cattlemen Beef Association and National Pork 
Producers heavily criticized the 2011 agreement the UEP made with the HSUS.251 
The egg farmers undoubtedly found the lobbying and litigation challenges as 
prohibitively expensive, especially when they are not successful. Public, consumer, 
and commercial sentiments support these animal welfare efforts in farming and 
food production. For the UEP and those who sell and use eggs, it is better to control 
how and when the change to battery cages is made. This is more desirable than 
being forced to make these changes by a court or another state legislature. 
With its conclusion, the California Egg Case illustrates that a state may succeed 
in legally defending farm animal welfare measures aimed at a large-scale agricultural 
industry, such as hen eggs, when three conditions exist. First, there was industrial 
support for the measures. Egg producer associations had already decided to phase 
out battery cages on their own terms, versus being required to do so by potential 
state or federal regulations. Second, the industry had changed its position on the 
battery-cage phase outs. It stopped resisting an end to battery-cage use. The change 
reflected industry lessons learned from overseas experiences and from listening to 
consumer preferences. Third, economic discrimination could not be proven easily 
since in-state and out-of-state egg farmers faced the same regulation, barring sales 
for battery-cage eggs. In theory, this could easily change if an egg farmer would 
bring a lawsuit as a private actor suffering economic injury after AB 1437’s became 
effective. It could be argued that Proposition 2 made California egg farmers 
susceptible to lower-cost eggs from outside California, not subject to the bans on 
battery cages. For this reason, AB 1437 was directed at protecting Californian egg 
farmers and an out-of-state producer would point to their consequent economic 
injury in court. 
In sum, seen purely in terms of case law, California’s animal welfare fights, 
over pork, foie gras, shark fins, and eggs, suggest that constitutional norms can both 
support and strike state policies. Dormant Commerce Clause violations are hard to 
prove, especially for small-market food items like foie gras and shark fins. If 
California farmers and food industries suffer the same harm as out-of-state interests, 
it will be difficult to find for out-of-state plaintiffs. In terms of preemption 
challenges, California’s animal welfare fights point to the likely preclusion by federal 
law when laws like the FMIA can be read to displace state-level ingredient 
requirements or operation requirements. For these reasons California’s efforts to 
prohibit downer slaughters was found to be illegal. Preemption clauses in several 
 
251. See Dan Charles, U.S. Pig And Cattle Producers Trying To Crush Egg Bill, NPR ( July 11, 
2012, 11:45 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2012/07/10/156551903/pig-and-cattle-
producers-trying-to-crush-egg-bill [https://web.archive.org/web/20170122194738/http:// 
www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2012/07/10/156551903/pig-and-cattle-producers-trying-to-crush-
egg-bill]; Ellyn Ferguson, Standards for Hens Worry Other Livestock Groups, ROLL CALL (May 3, 
2013, 8:07 AM), http://www.rollcall.com/news/standards_for_hens_worry_other_livestock_ 
groups-224516-1.html [https://perma.cc/W374-CG9P]. 
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food statutes include ingredient and operations preemptions, along with similar 
displacement for marketing and facilities. 
California’s legal plight over a battery-cage ban points to the procedural 
complications of litigation, essentially halting any court inquiry over the merits of 
preemption and commerce arguments. Viewed solely in terms of case law, this 
dispute provides the least illumination. But, when the California Egg Case is 
examined regarding why the hen-egg industry supported new housing methods and 
why states were plaintiffs, the case reflects a significant context. This is that states 
can enact animal welfare measures and that federal law is hands-off protecting farm 
animals. State reforms and a lack of federal law shift the legal contest to one over 
economic harms. With this kind of legal context, between states protecting animals 
and food producers suffering economic injury, food contributes to how 
constitutional law is formed and applied, specifically regarding animals and states. 
This Article next describes how this context develops from two perspectives, as a 
political food fight and as doctrinal jockeying between states and federal law. 
III. FARM ANIMAL PROTECTION: POLITICAL FOOD FIGHTS AND SETTING A 
DOCTRINAL MENU 
California’s recent attempts to ban foie gras, shark fins, battery-cage hen eggs, 
and certain kinds of pork point to two trends: political food fights about what can 
be eaten and doctrinal contests between state and federal law. Both illustrate how 
food, derived from animals, shapes law. This Part first describes the political food 
fight over animal welfare using food studies concepts. California’s recent animal 
welfare litigation illuminates political lessons supporting and challenging state-level 
reforms. Next, this Part describes a larger doctrinal contest between state and 
federal law to set the menu on how animals may be regulated on farms and in food 
production. California’s experiences point to future legal battles, potentially 
impacting ranching, meat processing, slaughter, dairy, and egg, poultry, swine, and 
lamb farm industries. 
A. Political Food Fights with Animals as the Prime Subject 
California’s attempts to ban food for animal welfare demonstrate political 
contests ending in legal resolution. These disputes are not just about the Dormant 
Commerce or Supremacy clauses of the Constitution, but instead involve public 
dialogue about what can be eaten or not. This Article suggests food studies concepts 
to examine legal contests over food. The Routledge International Handbook of Food 
Studies, edited by Ken Albala, describes how different academic disciplines study, 
research, and teach food topics.252 Produced as a multiauthored work compiling 
 
252. These disciplines and approaches include food and: anthropology, sociology, 
communications, psychology, nutritional anthropology, nutrition, archaeology, journalism, cultural 
history, literature, philosophy, linguistics, theology, art, film, television, food studies programs, 
American studies, folklore, food museums, food law, feminism, culinary arts and food service 
management, cultural studies, food and race, food justice, animal rights, food security, school food, 
Final to Printer_Hernandez-Lopez (Do Not Delete) 12/13/2017  3:08 PM 
2017] FOOD, ANIMALS, AND THE CONSTITUTION 385 
how social scientists, the humanities, food services, and activists approach questions 
about food, the Handbook includes contributions about food and cultural studies, 
food justice, and agriculture research. 
These three concepts illuminate how a legal dispute is really about food issues. 
Fabio Parasecoli describes how food and cultural studies focus on “connections 
between lived bodies, imagined realities, and structures of power.”253 As a part of 
this, food has both material and symbolic significance. Power structures, like the 
food industry and advertising, shape experiences over recipes, eating traditions, and 
shopping in food markets. This suggests examining how food is both materially and 
culturally important. Next, eyeing health and environmental risks, Alison Hope 
Alkon explains that food justice research examines how “racial and economic 
inequalities manifest in the production, distribution, and consumption of 
food . . . .”254 She explains that communities and social movements shape and are 
shaped by these inequalities. A food justice focus advances theoretical study and 
policy reform on food. Lastly, Frederick Kirschenmann points to new avenues for 
agriculture research.255 He emphasizes that for over half a century the food system 
has focused on the “singular goal” of “[m]aximum efficient production for short-
term economic return.”256 From this, farms seek specialization and economies of 
scale. Kirschenmann explains that rising costs in energy, depleting water and 
biodiversity, and climate change now challenge long-term agricultural goals. He 
predicts that sustainability concerns will shape future agriculture research. 257 
Debates about animals and food (regarding pork, foie gras, shark fins, and 
eggs) coexist with the Dormant Commerce Clause and preemption disputes. Central 
to these are the cultural, justice, and sustainability dialogues intrinsic to developing 
animal welfare policies. National Meat Association covered if sick or weak swine 
could be slaughtered or their euthanasia mandated by California. Association des 
Éleveurs I and II regard debates about if gavage is harmful force-feeding or it extends 
the natural process of fattening for migration. Chinatown Neighborhood Association 
explored if shark fin possession or sale encouraged cruel killing of an endangered 
species. It also examined if fins could be sold from sharks without their finning or 
from sharks caught as part of federal conservation programs. The California Egg 
Case covered battery cages for cruelly housed hens and if they were unsafe to hens 
and possibly to public health. For all four political determinations, the California 
 
tourism, senses, agriculture, and ethics. ROUTLEDGE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF FOOD 
STUDIES (Ken Albala ed., 2013). 
253. Fabio Parsecoli, Food, Cultural Studies, and Popular Culture, in ROUTLEDGE 
INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF FOOD STUDIES, supra note 252, at 274, 275. 
254. Alison Hope Alkon, Food Justice: An Overview, in ROUTLEDGE INTERNATIONAL 
HANDBOOK OF FOOD STUDIES, supra note 252, at 295. 
255. Frederick L. Kirschenmann, Anticipating a New Agricultural Research Agenda for the 
Twenty-First Century, in ROUTLEDGE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF FOOD STUDIES, supra note 
252, at 364, 368–69. 
256. Id. at 364. 
257. Id. 
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legislature sided with animal welfare. Courts agreed with these except for in the 
example of downer swine. 
These decisions also reflect food’s material and symbolic significance; 
centrality in redressing inequalities; and role in sustainability. In cultural terms, these 
animal welfare measures determined what was inhumane slaughtering; painful duck 
feeding; wasteful and cruel fishing; and cruel hen housing. Concerns for animal 
welfare and their corresponding moral questions entered public discourse and 
succeeded in banning the production and/or sale of edible items, which is otherwise 
legal in most of the United States. Moreover, shark fin and foie gras eating are 
associated with luxury and opulent eating and traditional French and Chinese 
cuisine. 
Similarly, these policies reflect food justice efforts. They were passed to limit 
the injustice of consuming slaughtered downers, livers from fattened ducks, fins 
from sharks, and eggs from hens in large-scale, small-cage complexes. The shark fin 
ban presents the most expansive justice concerns, since it made possession and sales 
illegal. It also came after bans on shark finning in California and federal law and in 
other jurisdictions. The foie gras policy banned its sale in addition to its production. 
Focusing on the commercial aspects, California attempted to eliminate the 
incentives to produce, sell, or serve shark fins and foie gras. The downer slaughter 
and battery-cage eggs policies are efforts to limit injustices argued to be the result 
of industrial farming of pigs and hens. These industries prefer allowing downer 
slaughter and using battery cages, in order to maximize efficiencies and limit 
production costs. Because they directly ban sales or possession or because they 
prohibit efficient farming methods, these animal welfare policies in all probability 
lead to some economic injury. This motivates farms, food processors, distributors, 
and restaurants to seek redress in court. When the courts ruled for California in 
Association des Éleveurs I and II, Chinatown Neighborhood Association and the California 
Egg Case, they determined that the costs of protecting ducks, sharks, and hens could 
be passed on to farmers and fishermen and fish merchants. 
California’s ban on foie gras, shark fin, and certain kinds of pork and eggs 
points to many of the changes in food production that Kirschenmann predicts. The 
state’s ban on battery-cage eggs and attempted ban on downer slaughters 
emphasized different values in food production. Farming practices utilize battery 
cages and result in downers when their priority is lowest cost and highest output. 
California’s policies, AB 1437 and Proposition 2 for eggs and California Penal Code 
Section 599(f ) for downers, tried to shift this focus by emphasizing anticruelty 
values. For battery-cage eggs, California succeeded in court, with most egg farmers 
not challenging the policies. For downers, California lost in court, since the federal 
meat inspection regime also includes humane slaughter regulations and it expressly 
preempts state regulation for slaughter operations. National Meat Association 
illustrates how policies seeking more sustainable or humane food production can 
find federal regulations to be a roadblock. The California Egg Case demonstrates 
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how when farmers are supportive of these changes, legal challenges may motivate 
states to sue the state passing sustainable food policies. 
The shark fin and foie gras bans point to how a state passes sustainable food 
measures that prioritize preventing animal cruelty. Here, what stands out is how 
California’s regulations take aim at events outside the state as well. California won 
in court arguing that it was targeting to stop cruel gavage for ducks and to stop 
removing fins from sharks. For both food items, the state did more than the ban 
the item in California. It wanted to eliminate the incentive for fishermen, farmers, 
and purveyors outside California to sell in the state. For shark fin regulation, animal 
conservation objectives bolstered California’s argument. Moreover, since the 2011 
changes to the Fish and Game Code section 2021(b) added to federal and prior 
California measures, its objectives were more defined and easier to defend in court. 
California represents a large-demand market for food industries. For this reason 
California passed the 2011 shark fin ban. Given California’s market size, the batter-
cage egg sales ban threatened hen-egg farming nationwide. Egg farmers had to 
decide to change their operations to sell to California or not and forego this part of 
the domestic market. In sum, these four California sustainable policies point to the 
legal and economic complexities of such measures that impact more than the home 
state. 
These four California food-and-animal food regulation efforts illustrate 
lessons that can guide lawmakers when developing future measures. First, in 
support of sales bans on food, California’s experiments illuminate a great deal. Any 
sales ban on a food item promises to cut at commercial opportunities by making an 
existing market illegal. Food producers and sellers invest in raising and caring for 
animals, the resulting products, and the goodwill their businesses build on this. 
These economic effects and losses fuel challenges. One way to limit the legal effect 
of these is long implementation periods for the bans, allowing food producers to 
prepare for when state policies are eventually enforced. In this light, legislation on 
animal cruelty does not result in unexpected or immediate commercial harms. This 
supports state-level food regulation seeking improved animal treatment. The foie 
gras ban was not effective until seven and a half years after it was passed.258 For 
battery-cage eggs, Proposition 2 did not ban these eggs inside California for over 
six years after it passed259 and AB 1437 did the same for out-of-state imports for 
four years.260 So far, courts have sided with California’s reasoning in these Dormant 
Commerce inquiries.261 Preemption inquiry does not necessarily examine economic 
losses to find a violation, but these harms do drive food producers to become 
lawsuit plaintiffs. The longer the period for food producers to prepare for a ban, 
the easier it may be to side with state animal measures in court. 
 
258. See Ass’n des Éleveurs I, 729 F.3d at 942. 
259. See Missouri, 58 F. Supp. 3d at 1064. 
260. See id. at 1064–65. 
261. See Ass’n des Éleveurs I, 729 F.3d at 942; Chinatown Neighborhood Ass’n, 794 F.3d at 1139. 
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Another political context supporting bans is that conservation- and science-
based justifications help courts to approve state policies, despite claims of economic 
burdens. California’s 2011 ban on possessing or selling shark fins provides the best 
example of this.262 The state’s efforts were consistent with its previous regulations 
in 1995 and a federal ban on finning from 2000.263 All of these policies are 
developed with justifications that sharks are endangered, this impacts the 
ecosystem, and fin consumption accelerates these problems. In Chinatown 
Neighborhood Association, the court weighed the state’s interest in conserving sharks 
with economic harms claimed by fish merchants.264 This governmental interest is 
not limited to saving the shark population, but also includes California’s role in the 
international trade and shark fin consumption inside the state. 
Legislatures benefit from devoting time and effort to having science findings 
in support of its requirements. Foie gras defenders argue that gavage does not harm 
the ducks, citing that the animal naturally increases its feeding and its neck permits 
for ingesting large items whole without a gag.265 Animal advocates point to a series 
of physiological evidence to counter this.266 California’s legislature took the time to 
listen to all of the perspectives. For this reason, the court does not second-guess 
these political determinations. In Association des Éleveurs I, this scientific-support-
and-methods analysis used by lawmakers helped the court side with California.267 
The political branches succeed in having their sales bans more likely to be found 
legal when these perspectives are taken into account in developing policies. 
Second, political contexts do work against state food bans, potentially 
motivating courts to strike them as illegal. For instance, food bans passed solely 
with economic objectives will face legal scrutiny. The six states contesting 
California’s battery-cage ban argued that AB 1437 only had an economic 
motivation.268 They argued that California’s efforts inside the state with Proposition 
2 did not pose a Dormant Commerce Clause problem, but the legislature’s later 
efforts banning domestic imports of battery-cage eggs were solely to protect 
California’s egg producers. They claimed that egg farmers outside California can 
avoid the costly Proposition 2 requirements. AB 1437 was argued as having the 
intent to protect California’s egg industry more so than to protect hens. These 
substantive claims have not been reviewed by a court, but they paint how similar 
measures will be seen by courts. 
 
262. See CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 2021(b). 
263. See discussion supra notes 165–76, 201–05, and accompanying text. 
264. Chinatown Neighborhood Ass’n, 794 F.3d at 1147. 
265. See Top 5 Facts About Foie Gras, ARTISAN FARMERS ALLIANCE, http://www. 
artisanfarmers.org/factsaboutfoiegras.html [https://perma.cc/VZ8W-MJQT] (last visited Nov. 13, 
2016). 
266. See HUMANE SOC’Y OF THE U.S., AN HSUS REPORT: THE WELFARE OF ANIMALS IN 
THE FOIE GRAS INDUSTRY (2012). 
267. See Ass’n des Éleveurs I, 729 F.3d at 946. 
268. See Missouri, 58 F. Supp. 3d at 1065. 
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Another example weakening a state’s animal welfare justifications develops 
when the animals protected by the ban are not endangered. California argues that it 
is addressing animal cruelty with bans on gavage for ducks raised for foie gras and 
battery cages for egg hens. Here, California’s ban cannot rely on conservation claims 
with ducks and hens, which as animals are not in such a precarious state as sharks. 
It can be presumed that with sufficient economic harms, a food producer can point 
to commercial burdens that are not counterbalanced by conservation justifications 
helping the state. 
B. A Doctrinal Menu for Farm Animal Welfare as State Innovation or Defensive 
Preemption 
A doctrinal menu in the form of federal regulation on farm animal treatment 
is the long-term contest looming behind California’s animal-and-food disputes. For 
fourteen years, starting with the passing of the foie gras ban, food producers and 
animal welfare advocates have been in legal and policy combat in California, armed 
with long-term litigation, expensive public relations and lobbying, and muddled 
Dormant Commerce Clause and Supremacy Clause arguments. Litigation on niche 
products like foie gras and shark fin and common practices like downer slaughter 
and battery cages has captured national attention, usually under the lens of “food 
freedom” or ending animal cruelty or descriptions of defending American farms or 
stopping factory farm abuse. Consumers increasingly care about what they eat and 
how animals are treated on farms and in slaughterhouses. Restaurants, grocers, and 
food suppliers know this and increasingly change their sourcing, operations, sales, 
and marketing. For this reason, the largest hen-egg farm association preferred to 
modify their operations versus suing California over battery cages. But for many 
farming and ranching operations, animal welfare policies promise to decreases 
profits. Many farmers and ranchers, along with accompanying businesses, fear a 
cease in operations when production costs rise due to mandated animal treatment. 
In court opinions, these contests appear as a repetitive federalism debate. This 
will persist because federal law is generally silent on animal treatment on farms and 
states have the political ability to regulate animals in food production. Food 
producers can look to Dormant Commerce and preemption challenges. But lawsuits 
are expensive and do not provide predictable results, especially with disruptions in 
multiple states. This Article argues that this will continue until food producers 
succeed in supporting federal farm animal regulation and Congress enacts it. This 
will operate as defensive preemption to innovation by states like California. 
1. Industrial Farms and the Threat of Multiple Animal Welfare Requirements 
Industrialized farms, or “Big Ag,” benefit from federal law’s inattention to 
animal treatment on farms. Industrialized farms are characterized by large-scale 
production of one item; technology-emphasizing maximum output, decreased 
production costs, and uniform output; and vertical integration with control of all 
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stages of production.269 The lack of federal regulation of animals on farms limits 
production costs. Wolfson and Sullivan describe animal welfare as virtually 
disappearing from federal law, especially for farm animals, with their only protection 
when slaughtered or during transport for a small number of animals.270 This 
exceptionalism goes beyond animals. Farms have been exempted from basic 
environmental regulations.271 This includes how animals are housed in concentrated 
animal feeding operations (CAFO) or feed lots,272 which industrial farms use. 
Industrialized agriculture is increasingly concerned when California and other 
states enact measures to protect farm animals.273 Animal welfare requirements can 
limit opportunities to set up shop in these states. But more significantly, state 
measures increase the costs of selling items like beef, pork, eggs, poultry or dairy 
products in these states. Barriers to interstate commerce arise when a state bans 
things like gestation crates, feed lots, downer slaughter, tail docking, or battery 
cages. The commercial impact is greater when a large-demand state like California 
passes these measures. In more political terms, the industry worries that as states 
pass more measures popular momentum for animal welfare increases and this 
motivates more state legislatures to enact animal-care policies. 
Three factors suggest that state laws on farm animal treatment will have a 
national impact. First, recently states have become more active. In November 2016, 
Massachusetts through a voter referendum enacted the Act to Prevent Cruelty to 
Farm Animals. Voters approved this by a three-to-one margin with 77.7% in favor 
of the measure.274 Supported by the HSUS and other animal advocates, the act 
prohibits the use of battery-cage housing for hens and gestation crates for veal and 
swine. Its enforcement begins in 2022. This signals that the HSUS and others 
advocates will seek voter support directly with state-level measures like referenda, 
voter initiatives, and proposals. This deviates from the HSUS and UEP agreement 
in 2011, which suspended these state-level efforts if farmers and advocates 
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273. For a description of state-level initiatives, voter and legislative, banning gestation crates 
including Florida’s state constitution litigation and similar bans by Arizona, Oregon, Colorado,  
and California, see SONIA S. WAISMAN ET AL., ANIMAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 400–01  
(5th ed. 2014). The American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals lists eleven state  
bans on gestation crates for pigs and for veal and battery cages for hen eggs, see Farm Animal 
Confinement Bans, available at https://www.aspca.org/animal-protection/public-policy/farm-
animal-confinement-bans [https://perma.cc/8LYT-YAPB]. In 2016, Massachusetts voters approved 
an initiative banning battery cages, veal crates, and pig gestation crates and banning sales of products 
made with these means, see Mass., An Act to Prevent Cruelty to Farm Animals, supra note 21. 
274. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 129, § 1 (2017); Abby Elizabeth Conway,  
Mass. Voters Approve Question 3, Banning Certain Farm Animal Confinement Practices, POLITICKER 
(Nov. 8, 2016), http://www.wbur.org/politicker/2016/11/08/question-three-animal-confinement-
results [https://perma.cc/S6DD-NB3B]. 
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succeeded in federal welfare regulations for poultry farms. Also, California may 
possibly have another farm animal voter initiative in the November 2018 election.275 
If approved by state voters, this measure would ban veal and swine gestation 
crates.276 Moreover, for eggs it would require cage-free hen housing, going a step 
further than what was in dispute in the California Egg Case. Titled the Prevention of 
Cruelty to Farm Animals Act, this proposal comes over a decade after California 
voters approved Proposition 2 by the widest margin of any direct measure in the 
state. 
Second, these recent state measures seek to ban the sale of food items, 
promising to impact out-of-state farmers, ranchers, slaughterhouses, and 
merchants. Massachusetts’s regulations are already posed to do this.277 Like with 
California’s existing shark fin, foie gras, and battery-cage egg policies, Massachusetts 
seeks to prevent animal cruelty outside the state by eliminating the economic 
incentives to sell in the state. The proposed California voter initiative would do the 
same for veal and pork gestation crates and for eggs from any caged hens. It is 
predicted that out-of-state pork producers stand to lose the most from this measure, 
since California does not have a large pork industry.278 It is estimated that eighty-
three to ninety percent of pork producers in the United States use gestation crates.279 
But already large food companies, including McDonalds, Subway, and Dennys, have 
pledged to in the future stop selling pork products from suppliers who use gestation 
crates.280 
The Dormant Commerce Clause inquiries focused on discrimination, indirect 
effects, and economic burdens, described above, will shape predicted constitutional 
food fights. Pork, poultry, and veal farmers are undoubtedly contemplating lawsuits 
against Massachusetts. They will do the same for California if the proposal gets on 
the 2018 ballot and if voters approve it. 
Third, pressure continues to mount for farms to change how they raise 
animals. The Pew Commission on the Industrial Farm Animal Production 
 
275. Initiative No. 17-0026, The Prevention of Cruelty to Farm Animals Act, (Aug. 29, 2017), 
https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/initiatives/pdfs/17-0026%20%28Animal%20Cruelty%29_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZK88-AYS4]. 
276. Cage-free eggs would be required by December 31, 2021, pork free from gestation crates 
by December 31, 2021, and veal not locked in crates by December 31, 2019. See California Ballot 
Initiative Seeks to Prevent Animal Cruelty, Protect Food Safety in the Golden State, THE HUMANE SOC’Y 
OF THE UNITED STATES (Aug. 29, 2017), http://www.humanesociety.org/news/press_releases/
2017/08/california-ballot-initiative-082917.html [https://perma.cc/R799-MCUJ]. 
277. Greg Henderson, HSUS Seeks Calif. Cage-Free Status for Pork, Veal and Egg, AG WEB: 
POWERED BY FARM JOURNAL (Sept. 2, 2017), https://www.agweb.com/article/hsus-seeks-calif-cage-
free-status-for-pork-veal-and-eggs-naa-greg-henderson/ [https://perma.cc/7EUB-X9GY]. 
278. See Tara Duggan, New Ballot Initiative Could Increase California Farm Animal Welfare 
Standards, S.F. CHRON. (Aug. 29, 2017), www.sfchronicle.com/food/article/New-ballot-initiative-
could-increase-California-12159349.php [https://perma.cc/7MXN-LYJS]. 
279. Tara Duggan, New Standards in Animal Welfare Raise New Issues, S.F. CHRON. (Aug. 15, 
2017), http://www.sfchronicle.com/food/article/New-standards-in-animal-welfare-raise-new-issues-
11818025.php [https://perma.cc/FK9Q-GC6T]. 
280. See Duggan, supra note 279. 
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(PCIFAP) produced a comprehensive report in 2008 documenting this need and 
proposing reforms in the areas of public health, environmental risks, animal welfare, 
and rural America.281 Titled Putting Meat on the Table, it identified how the rising 
demand for food, pressures to increase farm output while reducing costs, and 
concentration in agricultural production created the status quo of industrial farms, 
with farms appearing more like factories than rural, family-run endeavors.282 Most 
Americans are unaware of this, living far from where food is produced.283 It offered 
twenty-four recommendations, to respond to what is concluded was a system of 
that “is not sustainable and presents an unacceptable level of risk to public health 
and damage to the environment” and “unnecessary harm to animals.”284 The report 
was commended for its comprehensive approach to identifying causes, economic 
challenges, a comprehensive set of recommendations, and risks to persons, animals 
and the environment.285 It was expected as the public became more engaged the 
USDA, FDA, and Congress would begin work on the report’s suggestions. 
Five years later, the Johns Hopkins University Center for a Livable Future 
(CLF) reported on the inaction and lack of progress in following Putting Meat on the 
Table publication. The CLF director, Robert S. Lawrence, MD, explained that there 
was an “appalling lack of progress” and a federal “failure to act” and “continued 
intransigence of the animal agriculture industry.”286 Pew Commission Chair, John 
Carlin, added that with the public increasingly involved on these issues that 
policymakers are not listening to constituents.287 PCIFAP’s executive director 
explained that “inaction was inexcusable” when the initial report was issued, but 
five years later “it is unconscionable.”288 
CLF’s report Industrial Food Animal Production in America focused on six 
priority recommendations, regarding nontherapeutic use of antimicrobials, disease 
monitoring, regulations for industrial food animal production, intensive 
confinement, livestock market competition, and research in animal agriculture.289 
 
281. See John Carlin, Foreword to PEW COMM’N ON INDUS. FARM ANIMAL PROD., PEW 
CHARITABLE TRS. & JOHNS HOPKINS BLOOMBERG SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH, PUTTING MEAT ON THE 
TABLE: INDUSTRIAL FARM ANIMAL PRODUCTION IN AMERICA, at iv ( Jeffrey T. Olson ed., 2008) 
[hereinafter PUTTING MEAT ON THE TABLE]. 
282. See PUTTING MEAT ON THE TABLE, supra note 281, at x–9. 
283. See id. at 1, 3. 
284. See Robert P. Martin, Preface to PUTTING MEAT ON THE TABLE, supra note 281, at viii–ix, 
56–95. 
285. See Rick Weiss, Report Targets Costs of Factory Farming, WASH. POST, Apr. 30, 2008, at A2; 
Elizabeth Williamson, Farming Critics Fault Industry’s Influence, WALL STREET J., Apr. 30, 2008, at A4. 
286. Johns Hopkins Ctr. for a Livable Future, Analysis of Pew Commission’s Impact on Industrial 
Farm Animal Production, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg Sch. Pub. Health (Oct. 22, 2013), https://
www.jhsph.edu/research/centers-and-institutes/johns-hopkins-center-for-a-livable-future/news-
room/News-Releases/2013/pew_2013.html [https://perma.cc/8LJC-9FVH]. 
287. Id. 
288. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
289. BRENT F. KIM ET AL., INDUSTRIAL FOOD ANIMAL PRODUCTION IN AMERICA xiii  
(Ctr. for a Livable Future 2013), https://www.jhsph.edu/research/centers-and-institutes/johns-
hopkins-center-for-a-livable-future/_pdf/research/clf_reports/CLF-PEW-for%20Web.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/F9HD-U8LJ]. 
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Two of these, intensive animal confinement and regulations for industrial food 
animal production, reflect the political motivations behind California’s recent 
measures, described in this Article. In 2008, the Pew Commission recommended 
eliminating all intensive confinement systems, given the interrelation between 
animal conditions and their welfare, food safety, and public health.290 This included 
ending swine gestation crates, battery cages for hens, veal crates, force-feeding for 
foie gras, tail-docking for cattle, and forced molting of laying hens.291 Understanding 
the economic costs involved, it proposed phase in periods and targeted assistance 
for farm conversions.292 In describing limited successes in animal welfare reforms, 
Industrial Food Animal Production in America points to state-level efforts in five 
states, Colorado, California, Maine, Michigan, and Rhode Island, with bans on pig 
gestation crates, veal crates, tail-docking cattle, or battery-cage eggs, since the Pew 
commission study five years earlier.293 
Moreover, Industrial Food Animal Production in America describes how already 
Congress negotiates between potential federal standards for farm animals and 
preserving the status quo of federal law hands-off position on farm animals.294 A 
product of the UEP-HSUS agreement, Senator Dianne Feinstein, from California, 
proposed the Egg Products Inspection Act of 2013, that would ban battery cages 
nationwide over fifteen to eighteen years, require labeling of cage and cage-free 
hens, and bar states from exceeding the Act’s floor-space mandates.295 The Act was 
not approved by Congress and excluded from the farm bill. Agricultural 
organizations, such as the National Pork Producers Council, National Chicken 
Council and National Cattlemen’s Beef Association opposed this egg measure. They 
feared it would open the door for federal livestock and chicken protections.296 
As pressure mounts from consumers and Americans as voters and litigants, 
regulation and animal welfare stand out as the subjects of ongoing political food 
fights and the menu of doctrinal jockeying between states and federal authority. The 
interrelated causes and effects of animal farming noted in Putting Meat on the Table 
and Industrial Food Animal Production in America paint where California’s food-and-
Constitution litigation can easily replicate itself across the United States. 
2. Limited Resolution in Dormant Commerce Clause Claims 
Many state animal welfare measures are unlikely to be found to be inconsistent 
with the Dormant Commerce Clause when they apply inside and outside the state’s 
borders and when legislatures take the time and effort to listen to scientific 
 
290. Id. at 26. 
291. Id. 
292. Id. 
293. Id. at 28. 
294. See id. at 26. 
295. Id. (citing H.R. 3798, 113th Cong. (2012)). 
296. See David Rogers, Draft Bill Aids, Pork, Beef Lobbies, POLITICO (May 9, 2013, 7:04 P.M.), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2013/05/draft-farm-bill-aids-pork-beef-lobbies-091164 [https://
perma.cc/32Q7-F369]. 
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justifications and to identify their conservation or anticruelty objectives. For 
California, the shark fin and foie gras bans were not ruled to be in violation of the 
Dormant Commerce Clause.297 This appears inconsistent with case law involving 
state-level food regulations. In those cases, the regulations were found to be 
Dormant Commerce Clause violations either as discriminatory or as extraterritorial 
regulation.298 Dormant Commerce Clause inquiry focuses on whether a state 
attempts to protect its home industries with state-level policies at the expense of 
interstate commerce.299 The doctrine’s objective is to protect a federal market 
without barriers to trade between the states. 
In these three Dormant Commerce Clause cases, it would be unlikely to find 
state animal welfare policies in violation. First, if a state policy on its face 
discriminates against out-of-state interests, then courts subject the policy to a strict 
scrutiny review and most likely find it to be in violation of the Dormant Commerce 
Clause.300 This kind of policy would be unlikely for animal welfare and food 
regulation. In theory, California could try to ban beef from Texas or milk from 
Vermont only because they come from those states, but that is improbable. Most 
state-level regulations would point to scientific, health, economic, or animal welfare 
reasons to close off such domestic imports. 
Such policies spark the second type of Dormant Commerce Clause analysis 
for “even-handed” or nondiscriminatory regulation. California’s foie gras and shark 
fin bans were examined with this lens. The regulations impacted duck farmers, 
restaurants, and shark fin merchants and fishermen both inside and outside the 
state. Californian and non-Californian economic interests suffer from the same 
regulation. These even-handed regulations are only a violation of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause if the burden on commerce is excessive to the public interest. 
This is the Pike balancing test.301 For foie gras and shark fin bans, California’s 
interest was ending the cruelty felt by ducks and curtailing the depletion of shark 
populations and similarly avoiding the cruelty of catching sharks just for their fins. 
This is not outweighed by the burdens of duck farmers, merchants, or fishermen.302 
These burdens were seen as less given the implementation period, political goals of 
animal welfare as expressed by the legislature, and limited size of these industries. 
 
297. See id.; Ass’n des Éleveurs I, 729 F.3d 937. 
298. See Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324 (1989) (finding state beer price affirmations violated 
the Dormant Commerce Clause); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935) (finding state milk 
price controls violated the Dormant Commerce Clause); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State 
Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573 (1986) (finding state liquor price controls violated the Dormant Commerce 
Clause); Am. Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder, 735 F.3d 362 (6th Cir. 2013) (finding requirements of state 
origin markings on beverage bottles to be a violation of Dormant Commerce Clause). 
299. See 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 11.1 (5th ed. 2012). 
300. Ass’n des Éleveurs I, 729 F.3d at 948 (describing a two-tier approach to Dormant Commerce 
Clause analysis for direct regulation or discrimination and for indirect effects and evenhanded 
regulation) (quoting Brown–Forman Distillers Corp., 476 U.S. at 578–79). 
301. Pike, 397 U.S. 137. 
302. See Chinatown Neighborhood Ass’n, 794 F.3d at 1147; Ass’n des Éleveurs I, 729 F.3d at 952. 
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Third is Dormant Commerce Clause analysis focused on extraterritorial 
conduct. For shark fin and foie gras, the out-of-state effects of California’s ban were 
judged in relation to their local benefit. This effectively uses the Pike test for 
extraterritorial analysis. Prior case law focused on the practical effects of state 
regulation aimed at conduct “wholly outside state borders,” involving price controls 
for liquor or milk sold across state borders. This reasoning was not applied to foie 
gras or shark fin sale bans, since Californian and non-Californian actors suffered 
the same harm from the sales ban.303 Past extraterritorial reasoning was read by 
courts as focused on price-fixing or bottle labels required for beverage sales, which 
were not an issue for these animal welfare policies.304 Unless a state animal welfare 
policy only regulates activity outside the state and has the objective to fix prices or 
ban sales without state mandated labels, it is doubtful that a court would find the 
policy inconsistent with the Dormant Commerce Clause. 
Noting these challenges for farmer plaintiffs with Dormant Commerce Clause 
claims, federal legislation has been proposed to make state welfare regulations for 
farm animals illegal. This has the support of farming groups and politicians in 
farming states.305 Representative Steve King from Iowa proposed the Protect 
Interstate Commerce Act (PICA) recently.306 It would prohibit state or local 
governments from “imposing a standard or condition” on producing or 
manufacturing agricultural products sold in interstate commerce if “the production 
or manufacture occurs in another state” and it “adds to standards or conditions” 
under federal law or in the state or locality where the product is produced or 
manufactured.307 Representative James Sensenbrenner of Wisconsin also proposed 
the “No Regulation Without Representation Act of 2017”308 Its prohibitions are 
more expansive. It allows states to tax or regulate “interstate commerce” only when 
the actor is “physically present in the state during the period in which the tax or is 
imposed.”309 Both measures aim to stop states passing regulations that would limit 
imports of domestic food and agricultural products. 
Also called the “King Amendment,” PICA directly responds to California’s 
animal farm regulation.310 It was proposed for the previous farm bill, 2014, and 
 
303. See Chinatown Neighborhood Ass’n, 794 F.3d at 1146; Ass’n des Éleveurs I, 729 F.3d at 952. 
304. See Chinatown Neighborhood Ass’n, 794 F.3d at 1136; Ass’n des Éleveurs I, 729 F.3d 937;  
Am. Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder, 735 F.3d 362 (6th Cir. 2013). 
305. The National Pork Producers Council has supported these measures. See Carolyn 
Lochhead, California’s Hen Law at Center of Farm Bill Fight, S.F. GATE (Nov. 12, 2013), http://
www.sfgate.com/nation/article/California-s-hen-law-at-center-of-farm-bill-fight-4978974.php 
[https://perma.cc/JHS8-2ZN6] (last updated Nov. 12, 2013). The National Cattleman’s Beef 
Association also supported these measures. See Rep. Steve King, The Protect Interstate Commerce Act 
Offers State Trade Solution, NAT’L CATTLEMEN’S BEEF ASS’N (last visited Oct. 22, 2017), https://
www.beefusa.org/ourviewscolumns.aspx?NewsID=2620 [https://perma.cc/5U5K-YQJV]. 
306. H.R. 3599, 115th Cong. (2017). 
307. Id. § 2(a). 
308. No Regulation Without Representation Act of 2017, H.R. 2887, 115th Cong. § 1 (2017). 
309. Id. § 2(a). 
310. INDUSTRIAL FOOD ANIMAL PRODUCTION IN AMERICA, supra note 289, at 26, 28. 
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included in the House version of the bill.311 With the support of livestock and 
poultry groups, Representative King moved to include PICA in reaction to the 
UEP-HSUS agreement of 2011, which supported federal legislation on housing 
standards for hens. Such measures would eliminate the likelihood of disputes like 
the California Egg Case and the motivation for voter proposals in Massachusetts and 
California. PICA was included in the House Agriculture Committee and House 
versions of the bill, but the Senate House negotiations ultimately eliminated it from 
the final farm bill for 2014.312 
PICA’s inclusion threatened to derail this farm bill. It was heavily criticized 
because it limits the ability of states to regulate internal matters. The Los Angeles 
Times noted that it would invalidate food safety, labor, farm-raised fish, and 
pesticide regulations.313 Another report added state regulations for animal 
antibiotics, GMO labels, farm animals, food additives, dog breeding, and much 
more.314 Then, PICA was opposed by over 100 members of Congress and by over 
100 organizations.315 
Current proposals by Representative King and Representative Sensenbrenner 
promise to only attract as much opposition, perhaps more so with renewed public 
successes with voters in Massachusetts and planned for in California. Moreover, 
corporate food industries are moving away from whole-heartedly resisting animal 
welfare measures with consumers prioritizing ethical and sustainable farming.316 
PICA moves away from federal reform for farm animal treatment.317 It goes beyond 
the federal hands-off farm animal policy that is traditional in American law. It tries 
to ban state action.  
 
311. Philip Brasher, Dogs, Cats, Horses, Too: Animal Welfare Debates Could Tie Up Farm Bill, 
AGRI-PULSE (Aug. 30, 2017), https://www.agri-pulse.com/articles/9746-dogs-cats-horses-too-
animal-welfare-debates-could-toe-up-farm-bill [https://perma.cc/NG95-2CQU]; Lochhead, supra 
note 305. 
312. Brasher, supra note 311. 
313. See Times Editorial Board, Editorial, Iowa Rep. Steve King Lays an Egg on the Farm Bill, 
L.A. TIMES ( Jan. 23, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-king-amendment-
farm-bill-20140123-story.html [https://perma.cc/9QHH-U3BL]. 
314. ANIMAL LAW COMMITTEE, N.Y.C. BAR ASS’N, THE “PROTECT INTERSTATE 
COMMERCE ACT” AMENDMENT (REP. KING): FEDERAL AGRICULTURE REFORM AND RISK 
MANAGEMENT ACT OF 2013 (Oct. 2013), http://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/20072583-
ProtectInterstateCommerceActAmendmenttoHR1947.pdf [https://perma.cc/AG6R-FAZJ]. 
315. See Compendium of Publicly Stated Opposition to Rep. Steve King’s Farm Bill Amendment, 
THE HUMANE SOC’Y OF THE UNITED STATES ( Jan. 23, 2014), http://www.humanesociety.org/
assets/pdfs/legislation/king-amendment-opposition-master.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q4XX-VUTW]. 
316. Anne Lieberman, King Amendment to House Farm Bill Ignores Consumer Trend, THE HILL: 
CONGRESS BLOG ( June 20, 2013, 7:00 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/economy-a-
budget/306637-king-amendment-to-house-farm-bill-ignores-consumer-trends [https://perma.cc/
W6J6-WZ4P]. 
317. See INDUSTRIAL FOOD ANIMAL PRODUCTION IN AMERICA, supra note 289, at 26, 28. 
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3. Industrial Farms One Day Will Seek Defensive Preemption 
Eventual federal preemption, with statutory law on farm animal treatment, is 
more likely to provide lasting solutions to these state and food producer contests, 
more so than lawsuits examining variants of economic discrimination. At first 
glance, California’s preemption jurisprudence appears like a muddle, measures have 
been found to be preempted by federal statutes318 and not preempted by federal 
statutes.319 Historically the FMIA and PPIA have been found as preempting320 and 
not preempting state regulations.321 
Ernest Young explains that preemption jurisprudence often looks arbitrary 
and inconsistent since diverse areas of law and policy are being reviewed.322 He 
notes that what causes inconsistencies is that preemption analysis focuses on the 
reallocation of governmental authority.323 For animal welfare, federal law is 
traditionally relatively hands-off, and states increasingly are taking on this policy 
area.324 For now, proponents of preemption, food producers and the federal 
government, will paint statutes like the FMIA, PPIA and Egg Products Inspection 
Act as broad. The FMIA325 and PPIA326 include a great deal in their preemption 
clauses, including bars on states imposing “[m]arking[s], labeling, packaging, [and] 
ingredient[s]” requirements or requirements concerning “premises, facilities and 
operations” that are “in addition to, or different than” the federal requirements. For 
state animal welfare food policies to succeed they will have to be argued as 
independent of inspection and these many requirements. Courts have interpreted 
the PPIA as preempting327 and not preempting328 state food regulations. Similarly 
the FMIA has been found to preempt329 and to not preempt330 state food 
regulations. 
This Article’s prediction of eventual federal statutes on farm animal treatment 
builds on Randall Abate’s edited book What Can Animal Law Learn from 
 
318. See Nat’l Meat Ass’n, 132 S. Ct. at 968. 
319. See Ass’n des Éleveurs II , 870 F.3d at 1140; Chinatown Neighborhood Ass’n, 794 F.3d at 1141–
42. 
320. See Nat’l Broiler Council v. Voss, 44 F.3d 740, 745 (9th Cir. 1994); Armour & Co. v. Ball, 
468 F.2d 76, 83–85 (6th Cir. 1972). 
321. See, e.g., Rath Packing Co. v. Becker, 530 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1975); Swift &  
Co. v. Wickham, 364 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1966). 
322. See generally Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The Presumption Against 
Preemption in the Roberts Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 253 (2012). 
323. Id. 
324. See discussion supra notes 29–53 and accompanying text. 
325. 21 U.S.C. § 678 (2012). 
326. 21 U.S.C. § 467e (2012). 
327. See National Broiler Council, 44 F.3d 740. 
328. See, e.g., Physicians Comm. for Responsible Medicine v. Applebee’s Int’l, 224 Cal. App. 4th 
166 (2014); Physicians Comm. for Responsible Medicine v. McDonald’s Corp., 187 Cal. App. 4th 554 
(2010). 
329. See, e.g., Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977); Ball, 468 F.2d 76. 
330. See Becker, 530 F.2d 1295. 
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Environmental Law?331 It sets a law and policy course for animal law’s future 
summarized by the simple proposition that animal law is fifty years behind 
environmental law with states currently providing piecemeal and disjointed 
approaches. The history of the Clean Air Act of 1970 illustrates how the automobile 
and coal industries found it more desirable to support federal clean air regulation.332 
This was because one set of norms for all domestic operations, regulating 
manufacturing and marketing cars and mining or coal energy production, was easier 
to comply with, avoided costly litigation or lobbying contests state-by-state, and 
provided certainty in terms of costs of doing business. These industries, which 
stood to lose most from patchwork environmental regulations, preferred to have 
federal regulation of their operations versus regulations focused on an item. This is 
similar to industrial agriculture’s support for federal regulation of an operation, as 
in National Meat Association, where compliance can be prepared for as a business 
and then proven. To the contrary would be regulation prohibiting an item, like foie 
gras or shark fins, where it becomes difficult for farmers, merchants, or fishermen 
to sell the product or proving their operations comply. 
This future look at animal law paints federal statutes as evolving in six stages. 
Donald Elliott, Bruce Ackerman, and John Millian describe how environmental law 
became federal in the United States along separate stages as common law, political 
costs externalization, preemptive federalization, aspirational law, legal bureaucracy, 
and revision.333 California’s recent examples with foie gras, shark fins, and battery-
cage eggs best resemble the second stage of political costs externalization. In this 
phase, the costs of animal welfare regulations are mostly felt outside of the state 
that passes regulations. The subjected industry is passive and disorganized in its 
response, while scientific justifications and proregulation interest groups 
increasingly become organized. As an increasing number of states pass specific 
measure barring certain animal farming methods or pass comprehensive farm 
animal treatment laws, this stage explains much of the status quo. Abate describes 
that most of this regulation is not passed in states with a large animal farming 
industry, so state constituents as buyers chose to absorb the costs by barring the 
sale of food items they disagree with.334 California is the only agricultural state 
example, when the battery-cage ban required by Proposition 2 pitted state egg 
farmers against popular sentiment against battery-cage housing. Eventually, as seen 
in the California Egg Case, the battle was over where to market battery-cage eggs 
versus where they can be produced. As more states pass animal welfare measures 
while consumers, grocers, and restaurants increasing worry about animal treatment, 
 
331. WHAT CAN ANIMAL LAW LEARN FROM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW? (Randall S. Abate ed., 
2015). 
332. Elizabeth Hallinan & Jeffrey D. Pierce, Learning From Patchwork Environmental 
Regulation: What Animal Advocates Might Learn From the Varied History of the Clean Air Act, in WHAT 
CAN ANIMAL LAW LEARN FROM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW?, supra note 331, at 3, 3–41. 
333. E. Donald Elliott et al., Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of 
Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313 (1985). 
334. WHAT CAN ANIMAL LAW LEARN FROM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW?, supra note 331. 
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“defensive preemption” is contemplated.335 J.R. DeShazo and Jody Freeman 
describe this type of preemption when industries and proregulation forces succeed 
in converging their interest in federal legislation.336 Industries seek to avoid a 
patchwork of regulations and desire a ceiling to any federal bars. Proregulation 
forces try to avoid states having weaker regulations than others, inspiring industry 
to race to the bottom. For animal welfare, the proregulation forces would be animal 
advocates and conservationists and the industries would be farming and food 
producers. In sum, California’s four recent food-and-animal disputes point to an 
ongoing political food fight and a long-term contest to set a doctrinal menu between 
state innovation and federal law. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has introduced the suggestion that food equity debates about food 
in American society often take place as complex inquiry into constitutional law. The 
Article’s goal has been to identify how evolving efforts to protect animals in food 
production spark sophisticated constitutional debates. Food-and-Constitution 
developments currently transpire, as animal welfare policies enliven societal 
discussions about food. Whether commenting on animal cruelty, species 
conservation, or industrial farming, questions about animal treatment fuel a series 
of changes in food consumption and production. Based on this, eaters demand and 
spend accordingly, policymakers seek legislative changes, and producers as farmers, 
merchants, restaurants, fishermen, and ranchers all are inspired to respond. State 
and local governments will increasingly seek policies to limit claims of animal cruelty 
on farms, ranches, fisheries, abattoirs, restaurants, and markets. 
Concerning pork products, shark fins, foie gras, and eggs, California’s four 
recent animal welfare measures offer a current window into how food debates heat 
up constitutional controversies. California has tried to improve animal treatment by 
banning the sale and/or possession of these items. Seen solely as legal doctrine 
plates, National Meat Association is a federal preemption case, the California Egg Case 
is a Dormant Commerce Clause case, and Chinatown Neighborhood Association and 
Association des Éleveurs I and II cover both doctrines. But when these cases are seen 
as state attempts to regulate food sales and production with animal welfare norms, 
food’s powerful role in the Constitution and the Constitution’s influence in food 
debates begin to emerge. The Commerce Clause and Supremacy Clause are menu 
items deciding if states can or cannot protect animals. Routine preemption, 
commerce, and federal questions take on animal cruelty and food freedom 
significance. This pot of legal ingredients appears to simmer when it becomes 
obvious that California is just one of many states seeking these measures. 
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These four examples illustrate this Article’s claim: that state policies regulating 
food choices and animal treatment will face judicial inquiry balancing state concerns 
for animal welfare with federal concerns for economic discrimination, regulatory 
uniformity, and costs passed on to eaters and producers. National Meat Association 
shows how federal uniformity in inspections for pork displaces state animal cruelty 
policies. This applies to the process of slaughtering pigs, despite humanitarian 
concerns for downers. Federal law won. Association des Éleveurs II illustrates how 
banning a process, gavage, helps California’s foie gras sales ban. Association des 
Éleveurs I and Chinatown Neighborhood Association demonstrate how state policies 
overcome Dormant Commerce inquiry. These courts looked for economic 
discrimination and economic burdens passed on to fishermen and merchants and 
duck farmers and foie gras sellers. These policies survive since Californian and non-
Californian actors are subject to the same sales ban. Similarly, the political objectives 
of conserving endangered sharks and stopping gavage’s purported cruelty motivated 
the court to side with the state. The procedural holding of California Egg Case shows 
that any inquiry into preemption or interstate commerce requires harms from 
private actors. In three cases, state power to protect animals has won over federal 
norms. 
Farming interests and animal advocates closely follow this progress planning 
their future in terms of litigation, lobbying, policy support, and business model 
changes. This leads to this Article’s second claim that food-and-Constitution 
litigation feeds larger federalism debates. This evolves in two steps. First are political 
food fights over state animal welfare. Next there is setting the doctrinal menu for 
farm animal protection. This evolves as a contest between state-level innovation 
and defensive preemption. 
In conclusion, this Article serves up an inquiry into how food constitutes an 
important part of constitutional law. Ideally, it motivates further examination into 
the eating, food production, and agricultural aspects of other cases in constitutional 
law. The Article looks to the future, when eaters, legislators, and food producers 
will increasingly have to confront questions about animal treatment. The current 
offering is a political food fight, while a battle looms to set the doctrinal menu to 
regulate animals in food production and food sales. California’s animal welfare 
offerings involving pork products, shark fins, foie gras, and eggs confirm that the 
Constitution keeps these debates warm. 
